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Abstract 
 
Strategic practitioners and business scholars continuously analyze and 
study competitive advantage through innovation, seeking measurements 
that provide evidence of cause and effect.  As a policy matter and academic 
matter, the impact of intellectual property rights on innovation is still 
debated.  Despite the argument from authority via some bureaus, 
institutions and vested interests, who do emphasize some empirical studies, 
the matter remains unsettled.  This would appear perplexing considering 
the volumes of scholarship surrounding this topic.  This dissertation 
encourages a stepping back and, via refreshed considerations of classical 
and contemporary international business literature, a baselining of the 
analysis.  A means to balance the holistic with the detailed is necessary; 
innovation proxies, such as R&D spending or patent activity, are suspect 
given the fluid nature of innovation.  Offering an enhancement to the value 
chain paradigm, a means to assess innovation as comparative advantage 
demands respect to the holistic activities of firms and country institutions.  
Property rights are often employed to show economic growth and 
innovation; however, property rights require parsing to determine if 
physical property rights alone are an impetus to innovation without 
reliance on intellectual property rights.  The usage of patent as innovation 
proxy is challenged in this thesis.  Thus, the argument is constructed by 
viewing multiple, theoretical drivers that effect the firm as well as country-
specific institutions.  The results indicate that patent protection is not 
correlated with macro-level views of innovation, and it is not an 
appropriate proxy for innovation unless confined in the narrowest of 
scenarios.  
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1 Introduction and Objective 
As a construct for intellectual property (IP), patents have ostensibly been employed and codified 
into law for the express purpose of fostering innovation.  But does intellectual property provide 
any improvement upon market innovation and a country’s comparative advantage?  Moreover, if 
international business studies cite patent counts as proxies for innovation, there is elevated 
uncertainty whether the intellectual property alone represents the innovation dynamics within the 
firm.  Subsequently, these proxy innovation measures are then associated with the firms’ host 
countries, crediting them and their institutional environment with the innovative influence. 
Innovations arise through both exogenous and endogenous factors. The sources of these factors 
are amorphous and ubiquitous, collated and synthesized in firms via countless knowledge 
management behaviors and skills.  Therefore, patents are suspect innovation proxies, and 
potentially obsolete in a world that becomes more digitally oriented, informationally accessible, 
and collaboratively empowered.  In empirical studies, measures of patents should only be 
utilized with utmost care via rationalized and constrained specificity in any applicable research 
endeavor.  Policy makers and the populace at large, in the face of established patent 
bureaucracies and legalized rent seeking interests, should steadily eliminate and abolish patents.  
They represent assignment of monopoly power on knowledge, a public good (Jaffe, 2000), 
ignoring the definitional economic requirement of scarcity (Kinsella, 2001), while erroneously 
equating this public good as personal or firm-owned “property.”    
Such are observations, considerations and theoretical bases advanced in this dissertation thesis, 
which seeks to determine the impact of property rights institutions on innovation. 
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Several academic research groups and “think tanks” have promoted findings that property rights 
advance economic growth and are, therefore, beneficial for society at large and the improvement 
of the human condition. The ambiguity in these findings relates to property rights as firm-
specific advantages in both physical entities and intellectual entities.  Protection of property 
rights is rooted in country-specific legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms, which exist 
to ostensibly provide equitability among the citizenry and the firms who engage in economic 
competition.  This dissertation explores omissions, gaps, and ambiguity in many property rights 
evaluations, which have the potential for suspect inference.  Property rights assessments have 
been based on various criteria, which still require additional theoretical analysis and empirical 
testing.   One institution of note, the Property Rights Alliance (PRA, 2016), is focused 
specifically on a property rights oriented framework.   Like other similar groups, such as the 
Global Innovation Index (2014), Fraser Institute (2016), and the Heritage Foundation (Heritage, 
2016), the PRA’s message champions a proposition that property rights (both intellectual and 
physical) are positive factors on economic growth.   They have developed the International 
Property Rights Index (IPRI, 2016), which values and ranks countries according to their property 
rights, legal environment, and associated governmental policies.   This qualitative data is ripe for 
analysis and constitutes a material part of the thesis.  Further, the data will be empirically tested.   
The utilization of qualitative data (as many of the research bodies employ survey data for 
evaluating institutional impact) is suspect in empirical analysis and, per Kraay (2006), can call 
into question the validity of the studies.  To address this concern, there are several criteria for 
increasing confidence in subjective data inputs, and these are described in the methodology 
section of this study. 
John Chambers  December 12, 2016  
SNHU; Dissertation   
  
The Obsolescence of Patent Proxies as Country and Firm Innovation Measures  Page 10 of 166 
 
As IPRI (2016) cites Freyfogle (2009), “property is the complex legal institution that empowers 
owners to use parts of nature and also to limit uses of those parts by others.”  Property is a 
construct that influences liberty for individuals or groups in arguably both positive and/or 
negative ways.  Property rights are also considered a positive factor on innovation, and this is 
contended by IPRI (2016); however, from the perspective of this study, the agglomeration of 
both physical and intellectual property (without separation) is the dilemma.   
In this study, intellectual property rights shall be isolated for effects. The advantage of the 
Property Rights Alliance data, in the IPRI (2016) methodology, is that the property rights indices 
distinguish between physical property rights and intellectual property rights.  This is 
complemented by an assessment of the legal and political framework of each nation-state.  While 
various analyses have been conducted by the alliance, with intention of showing this index is 
positively correlated with economic growth, there has not been an exhaustive analysis of its 
relationship to innovation; nor is there significant evidence showing an intellectual property 
component adds explanatory causation. This deficiency in the research is remarkable and 
provides opportunity for researchers.  The core argument for intellectual property (patent 
protection specifically), is utilitarian in nature.  An extensive body of research uses patents as 
proxies for firm innovation; however, the application of such proxies has not been thoroughly 
constrained for its specific impact.  Patents, and intellectual property proxies for innovation, are 
extremely limited in macroeconomic analysis.  It is, therefore, the aim of this study to better 
substantiate that innovation is a byproduct of firm value chains as well as exogenous competitive 
forces.  The innovative capacity of a firm lies in its spillovers; these emanate internally and 
externally, via interfaces among endogenous firm entities and exogenous firm relationships and 
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observations.  It follows, then, that innovation measures at macro levels must include the overall 
output of the constituent firms, not merely references to those firms that produce patents, nor 
only those firms with large R&D budgets.  The patent itself is questioned and under investigation 
in this dissertation, in order to ascertain if its singular measurement is valid as an innovation 
promoter and if institutional protections of intellectual property are the cause of increased 
innovation.  Or is the institution of intellectual property rights an extraneous variable in 
promoting and instigating innovation?  
The general research question, extended by specific propositions, ultimately asks, are intellectual 
property rights necessary for advancing innovation when other physical property rights are 
secured?   
To scientifically analyze a set of associated propositions (later delineated), a comparison of 
models relative to innovation’s impact by property rights will be used to answer the above 
research question.  The differentiation and isolation of country institutions, physical property 
rights, and intellectual property rights provides a more granular and specific means for future 
innovation research, as well as a contribution to macroeconomic policy considerations in 
international business. Within this research the classical proxy for innovation, multifactor 
productivity, and the decomposition of property rights’ underlying factors, shall be analyzed 
within empirical testing. 
1.1 Research Motivations and Opportunities 
The challenge in the present research (determining if intellectual property rights are a more 
significant driver of innovation than physical property rights alone) is the scattered and 
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inconsistent means of measuring innovation.  Innovation proxies have been cited as R&D 
spending, workforce education levels, spillover dynamics and many others.  The impetus for the 
present research is to offer baseline simplicity, a grounding of the discipline, without ignoring 
detailed understanding and granular research surrounding innovation as firm competitive 
advantage and country comparative advantage.  Innovation measured as patent or other IP 
proxies imply acceptance that legally codified, intellectual property promotes creativity.  In 
opposition, innovation is too amorphous a phenomenon to simply isolate to patents.  How can 
these competing arguments for innovation (isolated across sectors, fields, geographies, regions, 
cultures) be assessed holistically while respecting the granular necessities and nuances of 
innovation?  Academic research requires a problem/issue to be pursued with sufficient specificity 
to advance the understanding of phenomena.  It is incumbent that the subject matter is not overly 
broad.  To guard against ambiguity or generalization, this research addresses the institutional 
concerns of property rights deconstruction as innovation linkages; nevertheless, the innovation 
dilemma is often one of “missing the forest for the trees”.  Innovation is a cross-discipline, cross 
value chain phenomenon and occurs through the virtually infinite number of actions inside and 
outside the firm; however, one cannot understand the “forest’s vibrancy” without understanding 
the particular inputs that flourish on the ground.  This dissertation thesis seeks to balance the 
holistic with the detailed. 
The study of innovation is broad and daunting.  Definitions of innovation are ambiguous due to 
“apples vs. oranges” product offerings and the ambiguous bundling of intellectual property rights 
criteria and country institutional maturity.  As an example, the fashion industry is an 
environment with little to no IP beyond brand trademarks.  Companies in that sector cannot be 
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measured against firms in technology, manufacturing, clinical research, etc.  What they do have 
in common, however, is an expectation that classical property rights (physical property rights) 
are respected.  Further adding to empirical challenges, there are many reasons for firms to rely on 
legacy products and not innovate in certain markets, as transformational efforts are costly and 
require changes in what had previously been profitable.  Nevertheless, innovation represents 
change and improvement.  Is that change promoted through physical property rights and business 
institutions instead of intellectual property rights?   The institutional relationship of property and 
innovation intersects with international business dynamics of comparative advantage, 
competitive advantage and the support of a country’s lifeblood -- firm-specific advantages 
(FSA).  A key FSA includes intangible assets such as knowledge and information; therefore, 
firms will exploit this knowledge and seek to protect the knowledge under institutional law – via 
intellectual property protection.  The protection has been endorsed and rationalized by 
governments to promote innovation and subsequently to make a home country more competitive.  
If innovation is advanced by intellectual property protection, then a country with a higher level 
of protection should manifest a higher level of output and change.  The intention is to investigate 
and test this; the investigation requires consideration of multiple dynamics and influences.  An 
improvement on the value chain construct of a firm shall underscore the importance of 
information flow and will also contribute to the testing, via recommending that the innovation 
proxy be one that is contextualized among a myriad of innovative forces. 
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1.2 Theoretical Background of Patent Shortcomings on Innovation 
“Innovation has been a constant proxy for measuring small business success.  Patent production 
has been the most common proxy to measure innovation because data is readily accessible” 
(Isom and Jarczyk, 2009).  Patents have been often cited to account for innovation trends across 
diverse disciplines, including international business.  However suspect and flawed, these 
measures are still utilized in international business literature, but is this a realistic measure of 
innovation?   Many patents are used for defensive purposes (Boldrin and Levine, 2013), 
ultimately preventing innovation by other firms.  In effect, the registering firm sustains its 
monopoly rights (and maintains a confined customer base).  This provides an artificially 
extended “first-mover advantage” (Liebermann and Montgomery, 1988) to a firm who initially 
captured a market.  If a firm has a monopoly right on a design or invention, yet does not 
implement that design, then how can one legitimately state that society is best served by 
innovation?  The firm would be granted competitive protection, which would act as a rent-
seeking attribute.  The defensive patent, in effect, precludes a first mover advantage to a firm 
who wishes to implement the same type of design or to improve upon the design.   The response 
to this scenario is a rationalization that the implementing-firm has an option to pay a license to 
the inventing-firm, implicitly suggesting that the implementing-firm may not have thought of the 
new design on its own.  Patents are not grants to the first who developed or thought of an 
invention; they are grants to the first firm who applies and registers the invention.  
In theory, an industry could be employing old processes, old materials, and old methods simply 
because an innovation was not allowed to foster.  The preventative measure for a competing 
firm’s innovation is a defensive patent that was never implemented.  Therefore, empirically, if 
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counts of patents are used as innovation proxies then all research must account for patents that 
were not marketed.   The inactive patents should represent a stifling of innovative activity in the 
market.  This limitation (or flaw in the empirical proxy) does not indicate the end of the story, 
nor does it provide a final response to innovation via intellectual property institutions.   
Innovation is change; it is layered change, building upon previous advances, patented or not.   As 
a parallel, “deeply layered change” (Bonthius, 2016) is a teaching strategy, and is also 
innovation-aligned.   Its focus is the evolving changes that are outgrowths of previous findings, 
inventions, happenings, or even the morphing zeitgeist.  So is it with all knowledge, as new 
capabilities, commerce, and ways of life build upon previous findings and experiential 
knowledge. 
Research efforts have often used patent counts due to limitation of innovation data, and without 
weighting or regard toward environmental or market transformations (Jong, Kemp and 
Folkeringa, 2003).  Not every patent is subjectively or objectively equal, and patent “quality” 
varies from both a legal perspective and economic perspective.  “For economists a good patent is 
generally one that fulfils the key objectives of the patent system, i.e. to reward and incentivise 
innovation” (Squicciarini, 2013). This is contextualized by Gullec and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2007) within the objective of enabling diffusion and further technological 
developments. 
From a subjective point of few, patents deliver products that offer a new way of executing a 
process, entertaining a family, expediting an online search, etc.  If counting patents is a means to 
conduct empirical research, then the sector isolation and normalization would become 
paramount.   The research exercise would be constrained to only invention of a registered 
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capability, and not associated with process improvements.  This is a very limiting idea of the 
term “innovation.” 
If patents are flawed as a measurement, why are they continually employed as a scientific metric 
relative to innovation?   Besides the fact that there is a large vested interest in the patent and 
intellectual property mindset (Ginarte and Park, 1997), patents are an easy means for measuring 
(Jong, Kemp and Folkeringa, 2003).   But are they indicative of the virtually infinite aspects of 
innovative change in firm and society? 
If an invention assessment is complex, then at what point is the evaluation process mired in an 
iterative expensive attempt to decipher novelty?  As a corollary, Petrosyan (2016) cites extensive 
difficulties in the appraisal process in science: 
“The evaluation of scientific findings is not a strict procedure but, 
rather, an art implying not so much comparison of them with the 
established guides and criteria or the demonstration of their 
consistence with or divergence from the existing knowledge as the 
revelation of conceptual and practical vistas they open. To cope 
with the task properly it is necessary not merely to know a lot and 
to be experienced and well-versed in high-level research. Much 
more important is to have scientific flair and taste, broad vision 
and far-reaching intellectual horizon – in order to be able to draw a 
thread from the subject under evaluation to the complex, 
sophisticated, and multidimensional context of science and – all 
the more – to the promising lines of its future progress. It needs 
more intuition and insight than formal and plain methods.” 
 
Following this argument, then what is the cost and difficulty in an intellectual property 
bureaucracy, which attempts to assess the uniqueness of an invention, especially since the 
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foundational knowledge to create that invention is dependent upon varied and diffuse prior 
knowledge? 
1.3 Contributions to Current IB and IB Academic Disciplines 
In a recent article for the Academy of International Business, Boddewyn (2016), with reference 
to Graham Ashley’s AIB San Francisco 1990 workshop “The Theoretical Uniqueness of IB 
Studies”, explains the prerequisites for international business studies.  He instructs researchers to 
ensure that their International Business (“IB”) foci are truly “international’ in nature.  Are the 
underpinnings to IB questions simply derivations and tests of universal theories that may apply 
to foreign samples, or are the theories specific to the dynamics of international trade theory or 
competitiveness?  The latter is demanded for the research to be considered international.  Among 
these considerations, one must determine if both dependent and independent variables are 
uniquely attributed to a group of countries/nation-states. Do the underlying drivers and factors 
help explain the idiosyncratic nature of the specific countries and their comparative 
advantages/disadvantages?  To qualify for IB research, findings and foci must not simply reflect 
a regional perspective or intra-country view, which does not specifically differentiate among 
nation-states. 
This dissertation satisfies the Boddewyn criteria, in isolating innovation effects by country and 
isolating independent characteristics of these countries.  As discussed in the methodology 
section, the variables not only have clear demarcation among countries, but are also 
distinguished and developed by country institutions, without overlap or ambiguity with other 
nations states. 
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Additionally, from an IB subject-matter perspective, the present study intersects with key 
functional/topical areas in the international business academic curricula: Strategy dilemmas are 
emphasized for firms as they consider the nature of innovation and what constitutes their specific 
advantage.  Globalization factors are impacted via the influence of property rights theory, 
openness to international trade, foreign investment and the dynamics of countries’ maturation 
process.  The institutional factors (whether in emerging markets or developed markets) are at the 
core of this theoretical analysis, considering the legal and political strains between developed and 
developing countries over intellectual property.  The quantitative analysis is embedded in an 
empirical approach that employs a widely-accepted measure of innovation (multifactor 
productivity) vs. theoretically valid explanatory variables.  And finally, the international 
marketing discipline is a necessity in the branding, promotion and adoption of innovation; even 
new marketing methods themselves are innovations and major contributions to the success of 
firms.  With respect to Moore (2006), “crossing the chasm” provokes a realization that adoption 
is also critical to this dissertation’s model, as innovation measured under multifactor productivity 
implies new products and services have been welcomed and adopted by a customer base.  
As many IB disciplines are intertwined with innovation, strategic practitioners must embrace the 
cross-functional collaboration necessary for optimal delivery and firm success.  The improved 
value chain construct, later discussed in this dissertation, should act as a blueprint for launching 
strategy improvement.  
1.4 Contributions to Future IB Research  
There are many vested interests in intellectual property regulations, not just in large pharma 
firms, nor software behemoths like Microsoft and IBM, some of whom are beginning to 
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liberalize their approach to IP.   Developed countries, whose multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have profited due to exclusive rights on certain products and processes, are risk averse to a more 
open view of IP rights (Hassan, Yaqub, and Diepeveen, 2010).   
Conversely, developing countries tend to believe that the developed firms are employing rent-
seeking opportunities and are even exploiting an institutional construct (IP rights) which is 
nebulous in nature.  This nebulosity is over a property right that does not represent actual 
“property” (Kinsella, 2001). 
The empirical studies are not of one voice. There is ambiguity in measures, often to advance a 
specific point of view.  This study will attempt to add insight into the fluidity of innovation, 
which is ultimately innovation’s value – the open and liberal ability for firms and countries to 
economically advance, while enhancing the human condition.  
Additional opportunities spurred by this research align with internal management effects and 
strategy, within the value chain, prompting the refinement of knowledge management practices 
and objectively-measured innovation execution.  As firms mandate a culture of innovation, the 
practitioner toolbox will require skill, expertise and research experience in enhancing corporate 
culture. 
Regarding institutions, additional insight as to the cause and effect of IP legislation may temper 
government assumptions that all IP is a positive force for country competitiveness.    
Finally, the study of innovation adds additional data and analysis in the realm of spillovers.  
While a more liberal view of intellectual property may provoke more imitation, this in turn 
provides firm innovation via servicing customers more quickly, providing better availability of 
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support, delivering products that are constantly refined and improved. This will foster global 
efforts for all firms to eschew rent seeking via the obsolete patent process and be more adaptive 
to consumer references and associated opportunities. 
1.5 Research Question Pathway 
This dissertation soundly narrows key IB disciplines, which intersect the motivational research; 
therefore, a pathway construction was developed to illustrate the iterative analysis and deliver 
assurance that the topic is sufficiently refined.  This is shown in Figure 1, Pathway to Research 
Question, evolving from classic IB literature to a focus on literature gap; opportunity for 
refining scholarship on intellectual property proxies and competitive advantage attributes. 
These referential considerations, captured in the diagrammatic boxes, represent both a horizontal 
and vertical means of confining the research, validating the research approach, focusing the 
literature survey, and settling on the key issues that molded the propositions. 
Initial research motivations included the IB fundamentals of comparative advantage, the root of 
all trade theories and differentiators among nation-states.  These differentiators include country 
institutions.  From the firm’s specific view, the value chain construct is one that provides clues to 
the inner workings of endogenous knowledge interplay and the strategic management of the firm 
itself.  
From these initial issues, Iteration 1, the study of innovation was provoked, whereby specific 
institutions would provide environments that will help firms embrace innovation as firm-specific 
advantages.  In turn, a country would be characterized by its ability to foster innovation. 
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Firm-specific advantages could be garnered by the leveraging of country institutions, which 
allowed the freedom of firms to innovate without excessive constraint.  Yet this still did not 
reconcile the problems of competing innovation measures and the institutional factor that would 
provoke the highest level of impact.   
 
 
Figure 1, Pathway to Research Question, evolving from classic IB literature to a focus on 
literature gap; opportunity for refining scholarship on intellectual property proxies and 
competitive advantage attributes 
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Further, in Iteration 2, property rights are identified as a significant factor in country comparative 
advantage and firm competitive advantage.  But in Iteration 3, property rights were muddled 
between physical and intellectual.  Property rights need to be assessed in terms of both physical 
property rights and by intellectual property rights, particularly since IB research often uses 
patents (an intellectual property construct) as its proxy for innovation.   If IP is removed from the 
equation, then is the institutional environment still positively impacting innovation?   The 
concepts of property rights, their modulations under knowledge spillovers and their various 
manifestations were key to understanding.  Legal frameworks provided ostensible promotion for 
both, but property rights are too ambiguous; the two types of property rights must be 
distinguished.  Following literature study and research, intellectual property rights were 
amorphous and did not fulfill the economic requirement of scarcity without overt and 
complicated legal maneuvering.  Intellectual property has become an institutional force unto 
itself, advanced by proponents as a utilitarian means for supporting the needs of a growing 
population and balancing the needs of innovators.  Yet innovation, based on value chain studies 
cannot be isolated to research and development of a product or service set.  Also, the assignment 
of a property right by invention ignores the dependency that the invention had on historical and 
current knowledge. 
Innovation can be measured by an assessment of input factors into a firms’ endogenous 
characteristics.  Country-specific firms deliver output (notwithstanding macroeconomic 
monetary biases) which is a measure of change – from input factors to innovated output; the 
firms have added value onto the inputs.  Can these measures be correlated with property rights 
institutions and can those institutions distinguish between physical and intellectual property?  
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The results of this testing may have marked challenges to worldwide policy justifications.  While 
U.S. companies complain that they have suffered greatly from the lack of rigorous and 
enforceable intellectual property laws (Long, ed. 2000), the enforcement consistency shall be 
increasingly important under international trade agreements, such as the Trade-Related Aspect to 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement (Ostergard, 2000).  However, as many firms in 
developing countries endeavor to catch up to the developing world’s technology capabilities 
(Kuo, Lin and Peng, 2016), there should be no surprise in the lack of urgency in formalizing 
intellectual property laws.  
In addition, testing a new proxy will offer a better understanding of firm strategy, which must 
leverage and orchestrate innovation that evolves and modulates throughout its entire value chain.  
The focus on encouraging innovation is increasingly a nation-state concern, whose only 
differences lie in their political approach.  For example, the policy objective within the 
Canadian-sponsored Jenkins Report (Sulzenko, 2016) espoused mostly demand-side instruments, 
such as investments in R&D (subsidies) and increasing quality risk capital for high growth 
business.  Sulzenko’s (2016) criticism included insistence that more supply side tactics were 
necessary, and that government regulators were entrenched in a culture that shied from supply 
side approaches.  Nevertheless, what is clear is that innovation is the concern of governments as 
much as firms, and the objective analysis of innovation’s drivers is paramount.  Noteworthy is 
Sulzenko’s comment, “Responses from OECD member countries to the OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Outlook 2010 questionnaire indicate that demand-side innovation 
policy is still considered a low priority compared to supply-side policy approaches, such as tax 
reduction, liberalized regulation and strict monetary policy” (Sulzenko, 2016).   The 
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undercurrent to his remarks reinforce the validity of country-by-country institutional and 
innovation differences.   These differences are at the heart of the empirical testing in this 
dissertation. 
If the policy tendencies of governments vary, then one must surmise that there will be marked 
differences in their innovation measures and in institutional macro data, later analyzed. 
To support the overall thesis that innovation does not depends on intellectual property rights 
institutions, the literature review will begin with definitional explanations, dilemmas and 
controversies, and then a focus on three major branches of supporting research.   
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2 Literature Review 
While the research question in this study is macro-oriented on the surface, there is a subtlety that 
underscores the international firm’s dependency on property institutions.  MNC performance, 
efficiency and other competitive measurements are reflective of institutional support 
mechanisms.  Conversely, innovation measured by country, and leveraged by country 
institutions, is reflective of the firms on which the country depends. 
Rationalization and validation of the research question is anchored by a grounding of classical 
and connected IB literature, historical foundations, and analysis of three major disciplines: 
institutions, firm-specific advantage, and innovation.    
2.1 Theoretical Rationale and Fundamentals 
In nearly all studies of innovation and its economic impact, Schumpeter (1934) is cited.   His 
scholarship in creative destruction is the foundation of competitive evolution and associated 
dynamics.  The construct of nation-state and the administration of tax policy intersects with the 
performance of resident firms and traders.  This research focuses literature and analysis toward 
the firm paradigm and the nuances and differences in countries.  Therefore, the cultural, legal, 
commercial, and societal forces, which impact the evolution of innovation, are necessary 
scholarship.  This scholarship is denoted in three major branches: innovation drivers and its 
associated political context; firm-specific advantage from natural advantage to monopolistic 
grants; institutional characteristics and constructs that influence behaviors and opportunities of 
firms.  These three major factors have been at the core of international business research since 
Adam Smith’s (1776) seminal study of markets as wealth generation, and since Ricardo’s (1815) 
differentiation of countries relative to their idiosyncratic advantages.  International patterns of 
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trade (via nation-state comparative advantages) were then refined by Heckscher and Ohlin (ref. 
1991) and explained as factor endowments.  These are building blocks (and institutional 
requirements) that firms leverage to deliver their offerings.  Country endowments are 
distinguished based on economic scarcity and the dynamics of foreign direct investment.  These 
very dynamics are quantified in research, owning to the extensive body of work concerning 
country competitiveness.   From country competitiveness, rationalizations and explanations are 
offered to describe and explain the relationship between the multinational corporation (MNC) 
and its engagement in the international world of commerce, with all its variations and 
phenomena across a virtually endless trough of domains.  The point of these IB foundational 
citations is to reiterate that countries are assessed by structural differences – geographical, 
institutional, legal, cultural, and historical, as well as by economic performance.  The 
explanations for country performance are steeped in detailed analyses of those various domains 
and subject matter, which have, historically, driven policy arguments and legislative action.  The 
enormous body of knowledge and research surrounding these domains has sought to not only 
explain but propose environmental and economic policies. These policies are championed for 
their ability to advance the performance of business, commerce, and society at large.  They are 
utilitarian policy rationales.  Therefore, it is incumbent on researchers to revisit the premises and 
assumptions underlying their subsequent propositions.   Countries will logically seek 
comparative advantage in any resource that helps improve its economic performance, including 
the public good of knowledge, and will erect institutions to artificially create scarcity. 
Per Heckscher-Olin (ref. 1991), countries will export products that use their abundant and cheap 
factors of production, while importing products that that represent its scarce factors.  Scarcity is 
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a natural condition of physical entities, but knowledge is not necessarily a scarce entity.  From 
Hymer’s (1960) research assigning firm behavior to so-called market imperfections, Vernon 
(1966) incorporated the time element, implicitly cited by way of a product life cycle.  The 
common-sense explanation for a life cycle submits that products will ultimately saturate the 
market or else the product becomes obsolete.  After a time, there is no longer a need for the 
product because something else has taken its place.  It follows then, that something replacing a 
product is an improvement upon the former, either in cost, quality, design or other features of 
attractiveness; the act of product substitution is sourced in rival goods, developed under a 
competitive environment.  A replacement product offers newness, via innovation. 
Competitiveness implies performance; performance implies distinction among rival forces and 
countries.  Were factor endowments the end of the story, then Vernon’s (1966) Product Life 
Cycle theory would be moot; but the life cycle theory is robust because of the time element and 
the forces that instigate change.  Products experience diminished demand not simply due to 
market saturation, but obsolescence or comparative inferiority. One of Porter’s (1980) five forces 
underlying strategic execution is the threat of impending or imminent substitutes.  Competing 
substitutes will mandate a firm strategy of risk mitigation and amelioration of this threat.  Left 
unaddressed, competing substitute products shall result in erosion of the firm’s product/service 
market-share.  There are several defensive strategies to address this threat, including cost 
efficiency, higher quality, and improved performance.  Each of those enhancements require 
innovation.  Innovation is the outgrowth and the expectation for any MNC to remain 
competitive; it is a force that underlies that advancement of all value chain contributions, and is 
not simply a matter of intellectual property.  Certainly, fundamental country institutions provide 
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an environment for MNCs to operate, and the higher the MNC performance the stronger is the 
associated country’s economy.  
In international business, the relationship of innovation and country characteristics will continue 
to explain behavior of firms, and this relationship acts as an objective means to assess those 
firms one against another.  The assessment is sensibly and rationally framed in analytical value 
assignments and overall rankings.   By way of national profiles, political and economic studies, 
and performance data, countries have been ranked relative to their strength (or weakness) among 
various economic and business related categories.  Subsequent to these rankings, regression and 
other statistical analyses have been employed to view positive or negative correlation with 
performance.  For example, the Fraser Institute (2016) has analyzed economic freedom attributes 
and their relationship to economic growth.  For innovation, various metrics have been utilized to 
measure country and firm capability.  But one of the challenges in measuring firm innovation 
relates to innovation definitions and measurement ambiguity.  “Innovation means many things to 
many people….” (Kaplan, 2014). 
The measurable economic performance of countries (nation-states) is advanced by the 
commercial activity of its resident firms, whose ability to deliver goods and services under 
intense rivalry translates to its competitive advantage.  As the speed of change has provoked a 
mandatory requirement for multinational corporations (MNCs) to find ways to sustain that 
competitive advantage, the focus on innovation is embraced as a corporate necessity for strategic 
practitioners.  While these competitive forces apply to virtually all firms, the objective here is to 
consider if innovation is dependent on IP protection and country-specific institutions; therefore, 
the MNC and associated country can be viewed as differentiators. 
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The innovation expectation has been an imperative since firms began competing in ostensibly 
free markets.  Technology today would be unrecognizable to consumers from a hundred years 
ago, just as it shall be a hundred years hence, relative to contemporaries.  As the information age 
has provoked an accelerated means for consumers and producers to communicate, as well as an 
accelerated means to reach markets, the forces of competition are exacerbated and firms are 
challenged to differentiate themselves in meaningful, market-capturing ways.   The very means 
of achieving market opportunity is a vehicle by which the competition can undermine advantage 
via imitation.   Jay Barney identified four major factors of differentiation (Barney, 2011): value, 
rarity, imitability and organization, known as his VRIO construct.  These were fundamental 
attributes that provided a firm’s product or service competitive advantage.  “Value” represented 
the attractiveness of the service or product offering for the target customers.  “Rarity” was the 
uniqueness of the capability or deliverable.  “Imitability” signified how easily the company’s 
offering could be duplicated by a competitor, and “Organization” equated to the firm’s execution 
model and aptitude for delivering the product to a varied and rivalrous market.   Three of the four 
VRIO factors (value, imitability and organization) strike at this thesis’ argument.   As patent 
protection is a major component in intellectual property institutions, the Barney framework is a 
backdrop to rationalizing and validating the current research. 
Arrow (1962) has submitted, if firms can imitate an innovation at a cost that is substantially 
below the cost to the innovator, there may be little or no incentive for the innovator to advance 
the innovation.   Yet, this defies a reasonable expectation that firms wish to provide products and 
services to willing customers, as well as a diminishment of the first mover advantage argument.  
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Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner (1981) found that, contrary to assumptions of many economic 
models, a patent frequently does not result in a 17-year monopoly over the relevant innovation. 
Patents do tend to increase imitation costs, particularly in the drug industry, but excluding drugs, 
patent protection did not seem essential for the development and introduction of at least three-
fourths of the patented innovations studied here.  On average imitation costs (within their 
studies) represented about 65% of the original innovation costs (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe 
de la Potterie, 2004). 
As Comin (2006) writes, “A significant fraction of innovations are not patented. For some, this is 
because they are not embodied in any new good or are not a recipe for a new chemical process 
and, therefore, are not patentable. Others are not patented because innovators simply decide not 
to apply for a patent.”  Further, he refers to studies where patents were not necessary to recoup 
innovation costs (Comin, 2006). 
 When a patent is registered, assuming it is not registered for proactively defensive measures 
with no expectation of development and distribution, the patented product or service of value is 
recognized for its uniqueness and precedence.  The patent represents an invention of sorts, 
something different that is attractive to the consumer or beneficial to the public, the buyer, or 
society at large.  This includes other intermediate firms in a connected or exogenous supply 
chain, wishing to incorporate the offering into its own value chain or development process. 
The necessity for innovation, under the Barney (2011) paradigm, is embedded not only with 
invention development, but also with the “organizational” attribute, the ability to repeatedly 
deliver the offering, manage the delivery process, and exploit its competitive advantage.  If an 
invention is worthwhile then it has an application-specific value.  It is a desired input into the 
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lifestyle of the customer or the needs of other value chains (and endogenous or exogenous 
suppliers).  A patented product or service is not an end unto itself.  Its purpose is to create a 
valuable capability for the consumer, whether that is higher quality, faster capability, durability, 
cost effectiveness.   The acquired patent pertains to an allegedly new way of accomplishing 
something, providing entertainment, or acting upon something.  The accomplishment, 
entertainment or acts themselves are the end goals.  If the end goal is the customer’s satisfaction 
in employing a physical object, then the innovative opportunity to satisfy a customer can be 
differentiated by a firm without the intellectual property construct.  The intellectual property is 
not a prerequisite for innovation, nor an expeditor.    
Nevertheless, patents have been widely accepted in research as an innovation proxy.  A review 
of literature has demonstrated the need for additional research, and the need for a holistic 
perspective in evaluating innovation.  This holistic paradigm can be used in a macro or micro 
setting. 
2.2 Intellectual Property: Utilitarian Objectives in Innovation 
“The importance of intellectual property was first recognized in the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property (1883) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works (1886)” (WIPO, 2016).  
As the administrator of these treaties, the World Intellectual Property Organization would not 
exhibit insouciance.  Citing humanity’s “progress and well-being” as the outgrowth of 
innovation, the evidence is conspicuous.  It seems absurd to question whether new inventions 
enhance the health and welfare of human beings; it is a self-evident and historical fact.  The 
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question is not whether innovation advances humanity but, rather, if intellectual property 
amplifies innovation.  The promotion of intellectual property by WIPO (2016), similar to many 
other self-interested parties, is advanced as a utilitarian measure and associated with 
expeditiousness -- a catalyst for rapid development.  Further, WIPO submits that “commitment 
of additional resources for further innovation” is an outgrowth of their recommended IP 
promotion; i.e., legal codification shall foster a wave of resource mobilization toward the 
innovative forces for the progress of humanity.   Continuing, WIPO claims that economic growth 
is the resultant condition of intellectual property regimes for the enhancement, enjoyment and 
quality of life.  The intellectual property system, WIPO emphasizes, is the equitable arrangement 
of the “interest of innovators and the public interest.”   It is precisely here where scientifically 
precise logic seems to be ignored.  The premises by which WIPO advances its promotion and 
championing of IP are absent relative to ambiguous entities called “innovators” and “public.”  
The proposed argument ignores the root provocation of innovation, which is necessity.  
Innovation is the evident, observed or implied changes in a product or process borne out of need.  
That need may be the desires of a customer.  And why does the customer desire such a need?  
Why is a change necessitated?  Why are rivalrous firms competing to provide the modification? 
Sakichi Toyoda is identified as the father of the Japanese industrial revolution (Serrat, 2010).  He 
developed the Five Whys means for determining root cause.   The application is not necessarily 
isolated to root cause analysis for problem solving, but is effective in the present case for 
analyzing the provocation for innovation. 
Ultimately services are aimed at delivery of change.  The vehicle for development is knowledge, 
the understanding of how to construct something or how to effect change.  Knowledge can be 
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tacit or codified (Caragliu & Nijkamp, 2008) but in either case the motivation is to effect change 
in the party who receives that change.  If one considers the “five-step why ” methodology to 
determine root cause, this can be applied to transaction theory (Coase, 1988).  Why is change 
desired?  What is the motivation for one party to ascertain knowledge or to transfer knowledge?  
Why is the receiving party desirous of knowledge reception?  To what end?  Ultimately the 
transfer of knowledge is employed to effect change in materials, instruments, necessities, 
products.  Even the internet is an example of an institution whose value lies not in itself but in its 
ability to facilitate the improvement of a service or a product.   If some knowledge transfer is 
desired by receiving parties such that the new knowledge provides them with new skills, the root 
cause analysis is extended by asking, why do they wish to have new skills?  The delayering of 
the question will always point to the acquisition of a physical product or environmental comfort 
that will satisfy their specific desire.   Innovation is the means to utilize a product in a more 
effective, accelerated, or seamless manner.  Its result is ultimately utilized within or via a 
physical entity. 
Firms are desirous of innovation as a skill and cultural behavior because it helps to differentiate 
the firm’s offerings, making them more effective and valuable.  From the micro economic 
perspective, firms wish to become more innovative for the purposes of competitive advantage.  
The innovative firm (or any firm) wishes to become the preferred supplier to the consumer.  
From the consumer’s perspective, the choice of supplier is rationally based on quality or 
capability of the service being offered.  The product or service is better than those offered by the 
competition.  The end game in transactions is, for example, the more comfortable chair, the more 
nutritious food on the table, the smoother pavement on the road.  (Note, there is a body of 
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research concerning copyright and trademark, intangible entities, which is not excepted by IP 
opponents; however, that research is out of scope for this paper).  Perhaps a firm wishes to 
impart knowledge in a more efficient manner; therefore, the value add to the knowledge is the 
ability to compartmentalize the knowledge, make it easier to understand, or demonstrate how the 
knowledge can be used in other work streams.  
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, innovation is the means for a country’s products and services 
to become more attractive to global consumers than products and services developed and sold 
elsewhere.  Country innovation is, again, not an end in itself.  It is a means for creating “better” 
goods and services for a worldwide customer base.  The country’s tax revenue is enhanced by 
the inflow of foreign investment or purchases from abroad; the FDI or purchases from abroad 
emanate from desires -- better or more cost effective products or services.  For a nation’s policy 
makers, innovation is promoted by way of institutional mandates or policy measures. These 
measures are offered as utilitarian frameworks, mandates whose end goals will make the country 
more competitive; as FDI inflows will expand, the country’s goods and services will be more 
attractive.  The means to create the attraction is innovation.  
Without innovation products and services do not become better.  Innovation translates to change.  
The innovation effected in a product or service constitutes a change in the way the product is 
created (faster, cheaper, more useful) or in the manner the product is used.  And change is neither 
dependent upon nor encouraged by a monopoly on certain information.   “Patent protection may 
also hamper further innovation, especially when it limits access to essential knowledge” (OECD, 
2004).  Further, when protection is so broad on basic inventions, follow-on inventors are 
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discouraged if the holder of a patent for an essential technology refuses access to others under 
reasonable conditions (OECD, 2004). 
 
2.2.1 Property Rights Justification and Controversy 
Per WIPO Publication No. 450(E), policy makers have emphasized the necessity for patent 
protection to foster innovation, alleging that patents provide incentives to individuals by 
recognizing their creativity and offering the possibility of material reward for their marketable 
inventions. These incentives encourage innovation, which in turn enhances the quality of human 
life.  But the WIPO statement makes a leap, as do most policy proponents, implying that 
innovation shall not be fostered without the government created monopoly on a particular 
knowledge set.   This strikes at the heart of the property dilemma and the notion of scarcity 
(Kinsella, 2001).  The allocation of property rights is a social construct rationalized by the 
concept of economic scarcity, the argument that property is held, constructed and managed 
because of the limitations (scarcity) of the physical object itself.  One cannot use an automobile 
without the consent of the automobile’s owner.  The automobile itself is a singular entity.  One 
cannot, by some supernatural force, use that same automobile without conflict; my use of the 
object prohibits the owner from using it at the same time.  More automobiles can be 
manufactured and other drivers would have an opportunity to acquire those other objects, but the 
initial automobile in question is singular, one and only.  It is owned and disposed of as the 
possessor sees fit.  Property rights were developed to accommodate the notion of scarcity and 
provide a means for society to identify control of physical objects (Bastiat, ed. 2007). 
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To make the example automobile “better”, whether that means faster, increased durability, 
higher quality or enhanced capability, a change in the automobile’s design is required.  The 
change is the result of innovation versus the initial structure and embodiment of the automobile’s 
capabilities.  Via innovative thinking, knowledge of the physical world, breakthroughs in 
technology of materials, processes or physical properties result in a change to the automobile. 
Due to force of change, innovation, the physical object or capability becomes altered.  Slightly or 
excessively, it becomes different. 
 
2.2.2 Question on Patents and Firm value 
Patents, as property rights construct, are an extended monopoly within a country’s institutional, 
legal, and legislated framework, and they are a salient component in this paper’s analysis.   If 
patents are pursued by firms, then one would assume that the patent adds firm-specific value.  
The patents ostensibly provide an exclusive right for the “inventor” to benefit and be 
compensated for utilizing the inventor’s product.  In return, the inventor will share in the design 
of the patent for the institutionally-stated purpose of providing knowledge and innovative 
opportunity to the public, including competing firms.   But the registration of a patent is also 
reflective of opportunity cost.  The average length of time involved in organizing data, 
constructing shareable artifacts, engaging in legal processes and awaiting patent approval is 
approximately twelve to eighteen months or more (WIPO, 2016).   This does not include the 
strategic planning internal to the firm, nor does it include the opportunity cost for first-mover 
advantage. 
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Patents are supported by governmental institutions as well as non-governmental forces in the 
legal profession and policy-making realm. Institutions represent rules, norms of behavior and 
social conventions as well as legal frameworks. Such rules are potentially codified. Members of 
the relevant community share tacit or explicit knowledge of these rules. “This criterion of 
codifiability is important because it means that breaches of the rule can be identified explicitly. It 
also helps to define the community that shares and understands the rules involved” (Hodgson, 
2006).   The citation here is significant, implying an enforcement requirement, such that any 
evaluation of patent rules or institutional measurements must include a legal and political 
analysis.  This, in effect, underscores the ability of the country to mandate compliance.  Patents 
are a macro factor as much as a micro concern for firms. 
 Per the OECD (2004), the acquisition of a patent is obviously recognized as an advantage.  
Simultaneously, there have been numerous claims that patents offer little novelty or that 
excessive breadth was granted, allowing their holders to extract undue rents from other inventors 
and from customers.  “This has been of particular concern in software, biotechnology and 
business methods, where patent offices and courts have had most difficulties in responding to 
rapid change, building up institutional expertise, evaluating prior art and determining correct 
standards for the breadth of granted patents.” 
The evidence that firms recognize the necessity of patents is seen in the metrics. The number of 
patent applications filed in Europe, Japan and the united Stated increased by over 40% (OECD, 
2004).   Yet OECD submits that patent protection may also hamper further innovation, 
especially when it limits access to essential knowledge, as may be the case in emerging 
technological areas when innovation has a marked cumulative character and patents protect 
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foundational inventions.  In the realm of international business strategy, one must evaluate 
whether energy is best expended in pursuit of patents or in optimizing the communication 
channels that foster creativity. 
Glazer (2015) submits that patents will subsequently “translate to innovative potential.”   But the 
term innovation is bandied about as though the only thing promoting change and creativity in the 
EU firm is monopoly guarantee for a potential invention, discounting knowledge transfer and 
innovative behaviors that occur simply in pursuit of capturing market share and delivering 
product at a lower cost.  This research is also at odds with Isom and Jarczyk (2009) whose 
analysis suggest that additions in employee headcount increase innovation while growth in sales 
does not increase innovation.  Their analysis also finds that increases in research and 
development (R&D) expenditures enhance small business value in certain industries, but not 
uniformly and not in all the industries investigated.  Ultimately, Isom and Jarcyk (2009) find that 
the number of patents owned by a small business is not a good indicator of a firm’s value.  They 
reference some broader studies (Griliches, 1990) that “stock market valuations using patent 
measures have been disappointing.”  But even under a more granular focus, small business-only 
and within certain industries. there was little significant correlation. 
As the question of firm value appears to be unsettled, just as the notion that IP rights as 
innovation enhancer is unsettled, there is nevertheless a firm focus on patent acquisition (OECD, 
2004).  
As a backdrop to patent attractiveness, there is fragmentation in the patent protocol of the 
European Union. Results of this misalignment have elevated uncertainty for management, 
increased lawsuits due to multiple or parallel litigation, and exacerbated economic and legal 
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inconsistencies (Glazer, 2015).  This underscores the fact that country institutions vary regarding 
IP.   
To measure the effectiveness of any intellectual property institutions, the enforcement 
mechanism is a required component; otherwise, a patent has no significance and there would be 
no compliance to the exclusivity construct.  If illegal duplication or patent infringement is not 
prosecuted within a nation-state, then the means to measure effectivity of the patent is 
impossible.   This aspect of intellectual property is critical in country analysis and its 
development progress.  Per Maskus (2010), “Small domestic markets along with the relative 
absence of local adaptation capacities, skilled labor, and weak governance and infrastructure in 
the poorest countries tend to make IPRs (intellectual property rights) inconsequential with 
respect to both inward technology transfer and local innovation.”   Although Maskus’ context 
was climate change regimes and policy making, the quote is remarkable.   
There is an implication that absorptive capacity is critical to the country’s innovation 
environment.  It is not an illogical step to consider that firm-specific innovation and country 
specific innovation both depend upon cultures that can synthesize knowledge.  Absorptive 
capacity pertains to country environments as well as firm environment; absorptive capacity in the 
firm value chain complements innovation. 
Providing a sensible and concise view of the term, the Oslo Manual (OECD, 2005) defines 
innovation as “the implementation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
or process, a new marketing method, or a new organisational method in business practices, 
workplace organisation or external relations.” 
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Innovation cannot be explained by a patent alone, which is often used as a proxy.  This is not to 
say that all use of patents is inappropriate, but the quote above highlights the theoretical interplay 
of multiple factors; this shall be discussed concerning value chain analysis.  If innovation can 
apply to business practices, is there no spillover of innovation approaches into other parts of the 
firm’s value chain?  It would theoretically be logical to imply that a firm, which embraces 
innovation as a cultural theme, would encourage an open and collaborative environment, 
whereby strategic practitioners would promote the innovative efforts cross-functionally. 
 
2.2.3 Country Comparisons 
In an assessment of economic advancement there are several private institutions who measure 
and rank, via quantitative and qualitative means, the economic freedom of each country.  Two 
institutes that come to mind are the Heritage Foundation (2016) and the previously mentioned 
Fraser Institute (2016).   Both assess a country’s vibrancy and opportunity by way of many 
attributes that are said to indicate factors for economic freedom.  Within these frameworks is the 
concept of property rights.   For both institutions, property rights are measured by a mix of legal 
and statutory institutions and cultural attributes.  The resultant measure is a hybrid of both 
intellectual and physical property; however, their analyses do not have the necessary granularity 
to determine if the removal of intellectual property as an attribute would have a bearing on their 
dependent variable, usually identified as FDI, GDP growth or GDP per capita.  Both institutions 
have stressed the need for entrepreneurs to expect supernormal profits by enjoying some kind of 
monopolistic power over their inventions. That expectation would encourage them to devote 
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time and money to innovation activities.  But the present research seeks to refine property rights 
impacts and determine impact (or not) of intellectual property vs. physical property. 
In the absence of an objective or scientific measure for innovation, there are many proxies 
beyond patents, including R&D spending, R&D staff sizes, product announcements, etc. The 
innovation output is influenced by the innovative inputs and the innovation process (Jong, Kemp 
and Folkeringa, 2003). 
As for patents, they are used as both an input proxy to the innovation process and an output 
proxy.  “A survey of economic studies reveals that patents are the most preferred IP rights in 
relation to technological innovations. This seems to be due to the use of the terms ‘innovation’ 
and ‘invention’ as synonyms.”  This may explain why studies on innovation have, in many cases, 
treated patents as proxy input for innovation (Jong, Kemp and Folkeringa, 2003).  But patents are 
only one facet of innovation; innovation is value-chain related as well as endogenously 
conceived. 
As an intermediate output of the innovation process, patents are metrics indicating the result of 
the creative process.  The accuracy of the metric is considered high, as the data is housed in 
institutions that are open and transparent.  The numbers refer specifically to inventions that have 
proceeded through the confirmation and validation process of the governmental patenting body.  
Yet this aspect of innovation is limited; process and service innovations are often not captured 
(or impossible to capture) as officially, institutionally recognized discrete outputs.  An inhibitor 
or dissuader to patents would be the imitation cost factor.  If it is more feasible to imitate a 
capability, then the lengthy process for patent is avoided. (Kleinknecht, 2000).   Kleinknecht is 
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correct is observing the narrow field of patents as innovating output, but he does not state that 
process and service innovations are additional inputs into value chain efficiency.   
Ultimately, the patent is used by firms to provide differentiation in a product. and sustain a 
monopoly advantage.  This differentiation is acknowledged and approved by the institution or 
governmental body.   The right of intellectual property is codified into law, and the utilitarian 
objective is to foster an environment of innovation.  Extending this objective, countries wish to 
seek innovation to become more competitive, attract more FDI and foreign revenue.   Countries 
(nation-states) seek to be the “supplier of choice” via their resident firms.   Therefore, country 
property rights institutions are at the core of this research. 
 
2.3 Three Major Branches Concerning Research Question 
In the literature review, foundational influences and rationales have been identified for the 
current research, including the controversies and competing research arguments, as well as the 
progression from historical IB forces. Synthesizing these issues, a triad of salient, major 
literature streams is offered to support the theoretical outlook of this paper, as well as a tool set 
for the strategic practitioner.  These three streams are at the heart of this research – innovation 
(whose relationship to various property rights constructs is under evaluation); firm-specific 
advantage (FSA, whose factors and behaviors shall be the fuel which promotes a country’s 
innovation strength); and institutional maturity (which marries firm innovation to country 
innovation performance).  These streams represent foundational explanations of trends, as well 
as opportunities for refinement.  Their constituent parts can help formulating the theoretical 
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concerns and rationales for the empirical model proposed later.  A fourth stream is significant in 
the study of innovation as it relates to intellectual property and patent measurements; that is the 
sector.  For purposes of the present study the industry or sector consideration is not being 
deliberately ignored.  In fact, sector plays an important role in the FSA.  Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella (2001) consider the conditions that technologies resemble a tradeable asset.  “What 
constraints limit the rise of technology transactions?  Under what conditions will specialized 
technology suppliers arise?  How does such a view alter the analysis of emergence of new goods, 
diffusion of technology?”  They cite the fact that a handful of engineering firms are responsible 
for chemical plants, where licensing transactions abound.  Software specialization is critical in 
the information industry with interfirm transfers, and in biotech small firms sign contracts for 
distribution and marketing, a similar pattern seen in semiconductors (Arora, Fosfuri and 
Gambardella, 2001).  Surveys on effectiveness of patents for protecting innovations submit that 
pharmaceutical firms place a high value on patents for protecting intellectual property more than 
other industries. “Innovation costs are very high, regulatory approval substantially increases 
time-to-market, and few R&D projects result in marketed drugs, patents are considered an 
essential factor in protecting competitive advantage” (Kortum, Eaton and Lerner, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the present study seeks to find a relationship, or lack thereof, for macro factors and 
their correlation with innovation.  In a stepwise approach to compartmenting the research, the 
institutional drivers and firm-specific advantages are being isolated as critical to the pursuit and 
the fostering (or limiting) of innovation.  Subsequent research shall focus on confining the 
research to sectors that are presently dependent on patents for their livelihood.  In the next 
sections, several fishbone analyses have been provided as toolsets for the strategy scholar. 
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2.3.1 Triad Branch 1: Innovation and its Drivers 
Innovation, shown in Figure 2, Fishbone Analysis for Innovation drivers, applicable to both the 
macro view and micro view, is driven and sustained in firms, via four major factors.  These 
factors provoke constant change and competitive behaviors.  They are categorized as funding 
resources (Capital), the consumer needs (Demand), the ability to monitor performance and 
address deficiencies (Feedback Metrics), and the aptitude and information that will instigate 
deliverable changes (Knowledge). 
  
 
Figure 2, Fishbone Analysis for Innovation drivers, applicable to both the macro view and micro view 
 
Aligned within this demarcation, the life cycle of development is inferred -- from initial analysis 
of environment; through the development of capability via firm strengths; and post-delivery, the 
analytics of customer satisfaction.  Demand arises not only via customer requests, energized by 
the forces of rivalry, but also emanates from the endogenous needs of other departments in the 
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value chain.  Inputs to the development, such as lower cost materials, better trained staff, more 
efficient operations are also internal motivators and expectations of the firm, fed into the delivery 
process as a motivator for internal innovation.  These endogenous demands provoke change.  
Change is a necessity and a competitive advantage. The customer, the end user, will have a need 
but the customer is not the innovator nor even the application visionary.  The subsequent 
innovation is the internal translation of a customer need into a product or service that can be 
scaled, packaged and shipped or, in the case of a service, branded, sold and delivered (Deming, 
1993). 
The capital input shown in the diagram signifies both financial, as well as human, capital.  The 
asset base will include both tangible and intangible assets, whose property will be defined as 
physical and intellectual property.  Via simple inspection, when viewing the Innovation outcome 
from all four major stems (Demand, Feedback Metrics, Capital and Knowledge), the research 
questions become magnified -- is intellectual property a necessity whose absence would diminish 
the entire objective of change?  Or is the ability to use assets appropriately, in pursuit of 
customer needs an adequate impetus for competitiveness? 
The Feedback Mechanisms go beyond customer satisfaction; innovation of service and product 
will be influenced by feedback from the delivery network itself, including those who are 
enmeshed into the firm’s processes.  Feedback is embedded into continuous improvement, and 
continuous improvement is fostered by innovation, whether incremental or transformative.  
Overlapping into the institutional literature stream, Kshetri (2015) promotes a view that 
innovation, thanks to intellectual property regulations provides security in jobs, protecting firms 
from losing their intangible assets to competitors.   This view is challenged by Douardo (2014) 
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who cites the dynamic nature of economic activity, and the advancement of innovation under the 
threat of rabid competition. 
Steeped in the foundational literature is Porter (1987) who identifies the competitive forces for 
organizations entering new markets and economies.   These threats include rivals who will 
compete in a field that is not necessarily equivalent to a firm’s typical experience.   Rozek (1988) 
and Long (2000) chronicle the intellectual property differences in countries, specifically 
emerging markets, as well as some of the means by which a company can counteract the 
ominous nature of IP anarchy.    
Within the stream of innovation research, Gueringer (1992) suggests that innovation must be 
embedded into the organizational fabric of the firm.   This is a critical component in recognizing 
innovation influences are cross-functional and not confined only to R&D.  In addition, the means 
by which firms measure their internal R&D expenditures varies. Accordingly, researchers 
typically use proxies for innovation services such as R&D expenditure, counts of intellectual 
property rights (Jensen and Weber, 2004). 
As mentioned above, a supply chain impacts the firm not only as an operational dependency but 
also as a spillover (Lamming, 1993).   
The literature researched at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO, 2016) naturally 
tends to suggest many advantages and positive innovation outcomes due to IP regulations and 
enforcement from one country to another.    Trade antagonism has been provoked by piracy, 
blamed on the lack of IP enforcement; yet, there is some evidence (Cooper 2010) that innovation 
has been spurred due to the open nature of digital capabilities.   
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As firms wish to exploit their advantages, innovation must become a way of life, especially since 
the dangers of competitive imitation are more extreme in markets that do not have strong IP 
enforcement mechanisms.   Measuring a firm’s innovation capabilities, is problematic.  “Why 
aren't more companies measuring innovation?  Because innovation is nebulous.  Definitions 
differ. Expectations vary” (Kaplan 2014).     
The competitive attributes of firms (and their subsequent contribution to the country’s 
productivity) remains virtually endless through the innovative opportunities in service or product 
delivery.  With the goal of providing value to a separate entity (whether the entity is in-house and 
dependent upon other input factors, or is an exogenous body called the external customer), the 
objective remains to improve the condition or the satisfaction of the consumer.  The objective is 
to provide what a customer desires for use, manipulation, enjoyment or facilitation in the 
consumer’s domain.  The consumer’s choice of firm shall depend on the distinguishing 
capability of that firm to provide an enhanced value for a scarce piece of property; therefore, 
innovation in services or products is not dependent on the intellectual property construct. 
The drivers of innovation were specified as behavioral and resource-intensive, aligned to an 
ownership advantage.   Some firms promote an innovation center of excellence, such that all 
processes within a firm can be analyzed and improved by way of innovative thinking.   Networks 
provide spillover effects that promote knowledge sharing.  As knowledge acts as a key 
ownership advantage, this is a differentiator for the firm.  The ability for firms to manage 
knowledge and manage innovation, especially in the absence of monopoly protections, becomes 
a strategic differentiator.  Firms need to direct and administer a cohesive plan and initiative for 
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institutionalizing an innovation strategy within the firm.   The efficiency and performance of 
these innovation programs will depend on the managerial skill of the firms (Mefford, 1986). 
 
2.3.2 Triad Branch 2: Firm-specific Advantage 
As the research focus considers whether intellectual property is a higher motivator than more 
traditional physical property, and since the competitiveness of a country is measured by the 
performance of the country’s resident firms, firm-specific advantage represents a second leg in 
the research triad as decomposed in Figure 3, Fishbone Analysis for Firm-specific Advantage, as 
related to Innovation motivations and performance. 
 
 
Figure 3, Fishbone Analysis for Firm-specific Advantage, as related to Innovation motivations and 
performance 
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Three of Barney’s (2011) success factors for strategic competitiveness are captured in the 
fishbone analysis – Rarity, Organization, and Value.  Imitability is omitted deliberately as 
intellectual property acts as an input to the Rarity stem.  The intellectual property factor is a firm-
specific advantage for those companies who acquire the government-approved monopoly; the 
concept of rarity is evermore significant in order for the firm to distinguish itself among 
competitors.  If one considers an absence of intellectual property, then two other FSAs are 
elevated – Adaptability and Support Prowess.  Unprotected inventions can be appropriated; but a 
first-mover (assuming the first-mover has execution/delivery capacity) shall have a market 
advantage.  Does a competing firm have any potential for advantage if it is not first-mover?  The 
answer is affirmative; the advantage would be in adapting the openly disclosed invention into its 
internal value chain and its firm-specific strengths.  Adaptability allows for competing firms to 
improve not only the design of a competing service or product, but also its delivery to new 
markets. 
Support prowess is an advantage for those firms who can provide an invention and can also 
service customers in the usage, portability and integration of that invention within the customer’s 
environment. 
These factors are ineffective if the firm is not able to mobilize its work force, supply chains and 
processes formidably.  Thus, the Organization attribute as a firm-specific advantage represent the 
execution capabilities of the firm, including its managerial skill and the educational levels of its 
human capital.  The intersection with the Organization (Barney, 2011) stem is implied as 
disciplined execution, and the ability for cohesive teams to synthesize the input factor of 
knowledge, then collate, structure and incorporate knowledge into the delivery model of the firm.  
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This is sometimes manifested in the “operational excellence” focus of the firm identity (Treacy 
and Wierseama, 1993), whereby the firms’ competitive advantage is the ability to deliver in a 
cost optimal, repeatable manner, with minimal defects.  Operational excellence can be 
misconstrued as disregard for innovation; but the two are complementary in a firm that strives 
for current and future leadership.  While operational processes are managed in a strict and 
standardized manner, the monitoring of such processes is critical to seek delivery gaps, input 
liabilities and root cause for errors and omissions.  The innovation lies in the management ability 
to root out suboptimal causes, improving processes by way of modifying them.  Innovation lies 
in the ability to transform or incrementally improve all facets of the value chain, not simply the 
registration of an invention.  
The Value of firm deliverables is the competitive objective for enhancing the product or service 
and customizing it optimally for consumers.    Standard performance is supplemented with cost 
attractiveness and quality. This is yet another opportunity where a non-first-mover can (under an 
innovative culture) improve upon externally sourced inventions or the competitions’ services. 
For firm-specific advantages, in the innovation paradigm and the question of property rights, the 
Dunning (1979) eclectic model fits neatly.  The ownership advantage is witnessed in the concept 
of property itself.  Thus, the dilemma is posed: will abolition of intellectual property collapse the 
firm; i.e., have firms found advantages in other capabilities as discussed above?  The institutional 
protection of property is analyzed and ranked in reporting bodies, such as WIPO, WTO, and 
OECD; this aligns with the Location factor of Dunning’s OLI model.  Knowledge management 
is the internalized process that a firm employs when market imperfections fail to provide 
equilibrium for supply chains and input factors; the search for creative ways to overcome the 
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imperfections demands organized and formalized means for researching and discovering 
opportunities.  If internalization is a firm-specific advantage, or can be a firm-specific advantage, 
then the endogenous, continuous improvement (innovative) processes allow for opportunity in 
customer delivery, speed of development, and expeditious value chain enhancements.   In short, 
firm-specific advantage is not diminished by the removal of the alleged ownership entity called 
intellectual property.   
  
2.3.3 Triad Branch 3: Institutions 
As the final leg in the research triad, Figure 4, Institutional Maturity attributes, as related to 
Innovation environments and rule of law, is shown below.  This illustrates four stems for 
identifying the maturity of country-specific institutions.  They highlight the constructs that make 
a country institutionally mature, and will be ultimately used (in various forms) as input factors to 
the innovation test. 
Political integrity is demonstrated by overall political transparency, a guard against corruption.  
This attribute implies overall fairness, by way of equal protection and treatment before the law.  
Oversight of the political process is key to the concept of fairness, with assurances that no 
advantage is provided; i.e. government is not choosing winners and losers.  The Access factor 
indicates if sufficient avenues exist for redress requests as well as recognition that the political 
environment is open to criticism and improvement. 
Hand in hand with Political Integrity is the Legal Framework, ensuring evenhandedness in the 
ability for parties to make and enforce contracts.  The judiciary is at the core of the impartiality, 
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as is the openness of the judicial system.  Institutional differences also cause strain among 
countries.  Relative to intellectual property, U.S. companies complain that they have suffered 
greatly from the lack of rigorous and enforceable intellectual property laws (Long, ed. 2000).  
But as many firms in developing countries endeavor to catch up to the developing world’s 
technology capabilities through technology (Kuo, Lin and Peng, 2016), there exists the rationale 
for lack of urgency in formalizing intellectual property laws.  The enforcement consistency shall 
be increasingly important under international trade agreements, such as TRIPS (Ostergard, 
2000).   
Network, access to knowledge resources, trial and error are important components for fulfilling a 
strategy of innovation.  Tools and assets include the endogenous processes that facilitate 
knowledge exchange and knowledge capture.  The network is the physical and intangible 
infrastructure, which can include the transport systems and the human connections.  Trial and 
error, assumed to be an R&D value, can apply to many parts of the firm, so long as it is managed 
and controlled.  As an additional driver, strategists understand that not all failures result in waste.  
The failures are also an innovative knowledge asset.  Access to knowledge is at the core of this 
research; the patent environment is a part knowledge sharer and part knowledge inhibitor. 
But what of the measures of IP protection?  If there is a correlation to test, then metrics must be 
employed for the macro levels of innovation and the country levels of IP protection.   
The absence of enforcement is a byproduct of corruption whereby some violations of legal 
guidelines are ignored, but corruption charges cannot be leveled if a country’s overall 
perspective and culture is not steeped in intellectual property mindsets.  
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Figure 4, Institutional Maturity attributes, as related to Innovation environments and rule of law 
 
Enforcement is a necessary measuring component for intellectual property protection; the 
implicit criticality is embedded in the measurements of legal framework and legal maturity.  
There is a different perspective between developed and developing economies regarding the 
criticality of intellectual property rights.   These rights were codified in advanced economies 
whose firms have operated, prospered and adapted to this business expectation.  Intellectual 
property is used as a lever. 
According to Shinkle and Kriauciunas (2010), “Most developing countries have committed 
themselves, pursuant to recent treaties, to raising their standards of intellectual property 
protection within a grace period.’  The time frame for these intentions remains unclear, as the 
developing countries do not possess mature intellectual property rights tradition nor the legal 
frameworks for enforcement.  This should not be an indictment of the developing work’s legal 
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structure; the culture of these countries (social and political) have not seen intellectual property 
as a significant concern nor an individual right under assault. 
But institutions are also vehicles enhancing knowledge.  They establish incentives and business 
practices that influence the competitive markets as well as provoke knowledge capture and 
information exchange (Hoekman, Maskus, & Saggi, 2005).  The question that this prompts is 
whether the incentive is monopoly-based or competition-based.  The policy making zeitgeist is 
the former, with full blown acceptance that the governmentally mandated IP framework is the 
inducement to innovation. 
Taken together, institutional factors are key to determining productivity and innovation; 
ultimately property ownership is upheld by the institutional framework and a transparent 
environment.  But the legal codification of intellectual property is promoted more on utilitarian 
grounds rather than philosophical grounds.  Thus, it follows that if IP protections do not advance 
innovation (the utilitarian objective) then why should they continue to exist?  This is a political 
question of course.  Nevertheless, to add credence to the argument that innovation depends on IP, 
one must ascertain whether IP is the difference maker in the institutional framework. One must 
consider if IP is an extraneous variable, impacting innovation dynamic in no significant manner 
beyond that which is impacted by physical property rights.  
 
2.4 Advanced Propositions 
Following the extant literature, whereby intellectual property (and underlying patents) is often 
used in social science research as innovation proxies, the matter cannot be considered a settled 
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one.  This argument is based both on empirical ambiguity as well as theoretical structures of firm 
and spillover behaviors, which clouds the historical analysis.   Intellectual property includes 
patent protection, which is not necessarily a valid proxy for innovation, and can be better 
analyzed if it can be separated from physical property constructs.    Moving to the 
methodological framework, the main propositions for empirical analysis are as follows: 
(a) The absence of country-specific intellectual property institutions does not deter nor 
impede country-specific innovation; 
 
(b) Innovation is advanced more by countries with strong physical property rights but not 
necessarily by strong intellectual property rights. 
 
(c) Firm innovation is a byproduct of exogenous and endogenous flows with dependency on 
legal institutions. 
Institutional metrics will be employed according to a granular intellectual property framework, 
with separation of property rights into institutional environment, physical property and 
intellectual property. 
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3 Methodology Fundamentals 
The Methodology discussion is encapsulated in an analysis of international business theory and 
rationales, to add robustness to the overall propositional arguments, empirical framework and 
appropriateness of key variables (factors) for testing. 
To begin, an enhanced value chain construction is offered, which is the lynchpin for the paper’s 
core argument; innovation is a macro phenomenon owing to knowledge management, spillover 
theory, FSA tendencies and, most importantly property rights.  Further, the property rights that 
will foster innovation are not necessarily intellectual property rights whose advancement is 
promoted more by IP rights activist supporters and rent seeking interests.  
 
3.1 Enhanced Value Chain Theory 
If innovation applies to the entire value chain of a firm, with endogenous spillovers (as well as 
exogenous spillover), then the confinement of innovation activity to R&D, as discussed 
previously, is limiting.  A view of R&D expenditures or R&D staffing diminishes the value of 
endogenous investments of innovation.  If a firm promotes innovation as a cultural construct and 
promotes an expectation of innovative activity and creativity, then the R&D spend is a relatively 
small part of the innovative force.  The validation of this paper’s methodology lies in the 
theoretical proposition that innovation is a measure of productivity, accounting for the cost of 
inputs into the firm.  The value chain of Porter (1985) aptly demonstrates that the firm output is 
comprised of, and a result of, a cohesive set of disciplines or business processes, distinguished 
typically in a cost center or departmental organizational structure.   
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By way of example, one can consider a set of corporate wide support functions, such as 
Infrastructure, Human Resources Management, Administration and Corporate Finance.  Specific 
departmentally-confined disciplines would manage business processes in Research and 
Development, Marketing, Operations, Sales and Customer Services.  The order of these business 
processes implies a development process, as ideation will be marketed to consumers; Operations 
shall ensure rigorous defect minimization; Sales forces will be mobilized; Customer Service is 
available for the feedback and services of the delivered product.  This framework was first 
published by Porter (1980).  The model alone, however, does not indicate the interrelationships 
of the firm’s departmental entities (those entities delivering specific business processes and 
functions with the objective of margin delivery and competitive advantage.   
This research paper improves upon the value chain concept by illustrating innovation influences 
as both external and internal to the firm, shown in  Figure 5, Enhanced Value Chain Model 
building upon Porter, recognizing the exogenous and endogenous innovative forces onto and 
throughout the firm’s business processes, with the output of the firm being a desired product or 
service for the marketplace.   As noted in the figure’s caption, the dotted lines represent the 
permeability of the firm, both endogenously and exogenously.  Knowledge flows are not 
confined to a cost center or function in the chain.  Knowledge flows are not confined to the firm 
itself.  Innovation forces flow throughout the organization, inspiring the innovative capabilities 
and the improvement of process and product. 
Formal silos contribute to knowledge confinement. “Many large organizations are divided, and 
then subdivided into numerous different departments, which often fail to talk to each other – let 
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alone collaborate” (Tett, 2015).   Therefore, the elimination of these silos is the strategy toward 
firm wide innovation, which is then manifested in market share and product/service adoption.  
 
 
Figure 5, Enhanced Value Chain Model building upon Porter, recognizing the exogenous and endogenous 
innovative forces onto and throughout the firm’s business processes; dotted lines represent the 
knowledge spillovers from without and within. 
 
In constructing an empirical methodology, the enhanced value chain view leads to a 
diminishment of patents as true representation of firm-innovation. This research effort is focused 
on the measurements of innovation and challenges the notion that innovation is driven by 
intellectual property rights as codified by patent institutions and governments. The innovation 
impact to the firm emanates from exogenous activities, shown in the upper left of the diagram, 
and endogenous activities, which are encapsulated inside the firms’ value chain construct.  This 
represents the knowledge spillover that occurs and which adds competitive value to the firm.  
Spillover management is a necessity in continuous improvement and in transformation; 
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innovative forces are not confined to the Research and Development (R&D) department of the 
firm.  Innovation influences are characterized by a cross-pollination of ideas and knowledge, 
enhancing the operational efforts of the firm as well as the creative energies.  To isolate R&D 
spending as a level of firm innovation is to ignore the myriad of knowledge considerations that 
are employed to add firm value, minimize operational costs, and breed a more vibrant company 
culture. 
The ability to manage the ebb and flow of innovation factors becomes more significant in an age 
of ubiquitous information.  “Innovation management has been defined as a set of organizational 
routines and activities aimed at developing a culture for innovation” (Cortimiglia,. al., 2015). 
As it can be expected, these routines and activities vary enormously among industries and firms. 
The systematic management of innovation at firm‐level is a complicated endeavor and, as 
represented in Figure 5, must grapple with multiple interdependencies and touchpoints among 
cost centers and departments.  As some models are product-centric, others are related to process 
improvement.  “As a result, there has been much confusion about what is and what constitutes an 
innovation management system” (Cortimiglia,. al., 2015). 
Value chain processes are as distinct as the firms themselves.  Although some standard and well 
publicized means for instituting continuous improvement (Deming, 1993) has become 
commonplace, the specific day to day processes within firms, even those of similar size are 
company-idiosyncratic. There is no “meaningful aggregate” (Jensen and Weber, 2004).  
However, the effectivity and significance of research advances can be accomplished in 
measuring macro-level variables, particularly as this paper aims to separate intellectual property 
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ambiguity and determine if physical property rights or other institutions are a the real driver of 
innovation. 
All innovation efforts are fruitless without the ability of the firm to embrace and synthesize the 
innovation plan.  Absorptive capacity is advanced when firms can instill awareness and 
motivation capabilities (Chen, Su and Tsai, 2007).  Supporting the present thesis, absorptive 
capacity and the innovative management skills vary across countries, and contribute to the 
international variation of realized spillovers (Meyer and Sinani, 2009).   “In parallel, the ‘right 
innovation management and the ‘best’ source of innovation will depend upon the attributes and 
environments of the specific firm” (Brem and Voigt, 2009).   Absorptive capacity supports 
technology and knowledge sharing, manifested in in firms’ or regions’ ability to transform 
knowledge into innovation (Brant and Parthasarathy, 2015). 
These references add emphasis to the enhanced value chain illustration, and support the macro 
analysis of country innovation and its relationship to firm capabilities and institutional 
environments.  The impact of innovation on a country is derived knowledge and knowledge 
transfer with three significant determinants: the country’s absorptive capacity, socioeconomic 
objectives of government support, and types of public institutions.  (Guellec and Van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004).    The latter two intersect this paper’s research insofar as 
government support is manifested in the patent institution themselves.  To remind, patents 
represent intellectual property and are not a natural monopoly.  They represent a privilege and a 
legalized monopoly for utilitarian purposes. 
As Hope (2001) affirms, corporations embrace an innovation strategy because competitive 
advantage is so fleeting.  That innovation strategy is not one that is isolated to an R&D function.  
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The firm at large seeks betterment of processes and capabilities, and this innovation will impact 
the day to day means of doing business.  “The argument for favouring more and better business 
R&D support is too simple.” It is based on a linear model of innovation more applicable to the 
past (Sulzenko, 2016).  The present knowledge age has added a dimension of innovation transfer, 
which will invoke new competitive approaches that were not previously necessary. 
“The notion ‘knowledge based society’ is a concept which attempts to grasp the 
multidimensional transformations which are taking place in the current society and serves also 
for the analysis of those alterations” (IPRI, 2016).   From the 1960s to present day, many 
economies migrated to a service based orientation, dependent upon a skilled and technically 
adept workforce.  The IPRI author notes that the post-industrial society promoted a shifting of 
resource valuation, from capital inputs, hardware and materials to knowledge.  There is a 
subtlety in this observation, which strikes at the core of the intellectual monopoly research and 
legalistic motivations.  Is it not logical to assume that those countries who had a comparative 
advantage in knowledge based resources (such as skilled and educated labor, managerial 
acuteness, process execution and innovative cultures) would naturally wish to exploit the 
advantage?  If human resources are equipped with knowledge synthesis skills, and if analysis and 
information constitute the differentiation of a country, then it is logical to assume that country 
would desire to distinguish itself by way of those advantages.  The firms in a knowledge-based 
country would promote an activist stance relative to intellectual property rights, ensuring their 
own monopoly advantage.  In effect, these intellectual property rights are artificially constructed 
knowledge based rights. 
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“Knowledge and information are not like other kind of physical goods widely traded in markets. 
They possess a specific characteristic referred as ‘non-rival in use’, that is, they can be used 
repeatedly and concurrently by many people, without being ‘depleted’” (IPRI, 2016).   The 
challenge in proving ownership, beyond the scope of this paper, is the result of virtually infinite 
foundational requirements, impetuses and inspirations that must have preceded the patented 
invention.  These comments require additional consideration.  The duplication or imitation of a 
specific arrangement of manufactured parts, chemical compounds or design blueprints does not 
infringe on the “usage” of said invention for any party, including the party who allegedly first 
disclosed it.  Nevertheless, knowledge is diffused by way of spillovers, and spillovers for an 
intangible entity do not have natural boundaries.   It is, therefore, logical to state that intellectual 
property is a spillover barrier effecting each country in distinct ways, impacted in varying 
degrees by their natural comparative advantages, climatological, geographical, and cultural. 
The “amount of resources innovators invested in (knowledge creation)” is but a small part of the 
firm’s value chain and shared activities.   An argument can be extended that the product offering 
(that which will differentiate the firm and that which will be patented) has naught to do with an 
efficiently operating purchasing department or an infrastructure management center that ensures 
email is working and that lighting is available in the hallway.   Ignoring these cross-functional 
dynamics fully disregards the interconnectedness of the firm’s ecosystem, and ignores the 
interdependencies of knowledge transfer and accelerated information sharing.  If innovation is a 
prerequisite for competitive advantage, then the accelerated delivery of goods and services to the 
marketplace depends (innovatively) on the entire operation and every activity of the firm. 
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“In a 'knowledge society,' structures and processes of material and symbolic reproduction are so 
immersed in knowledge operations that information processing, symbolic analysis and expert 
systems take precedence over other factors, like capital and labor” (IPRI, 2016).   This comment 
underscores the importance of the value chain innovation culture, and it strengthens the argument 
that innovation is not isolated to an R&D function within the individual firm. 
This research has submitted that creative/innovation output depends on firm-specific attributes, 
which blend departments and which are not isolated to R&D alone. The measurement of 
innovation within firm, per Kleinknecht (2000), is nearly impossible to capture due to the 
variation in firm configuration and the endogenous spillover.  Therefore, a macro measure of 
innovation will be offered to initiate a new look at innovation research and its relationship to 
country institutions. For the IPRI (2016) evaluation, the property rights factors are core drivers in 
ranking and assessing country capabilities.  Their focus has been economic growth, which they 
correlate with property rights.   
This paper’s enhancement of the Value Chain construct is core to the central thesis and 
methodology. 
 
3.2 Methodological Precedence and Hypotheses 
The Property Rights Alliance (employing the IPRI, 2016) as well as other institutions (PERC, 
2016; Fraser, 2016; Heritage, 2016), suggests that economic growth is correlated with property 
rights, whose institutional attributes will influence innovation.  Therefore, innovation should 
correlate with property rights valuations, so long as those valuations are theoretically justified.   
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The analysis of this dissertation and its investigation concerns whether or not intellectual 
property is a legitimate institutional variable for advancing country innovation.  As described 
above, innovation has become a catch-all word that has been manipulated and integrated into all 
manner of research endeavors.  If innovation is embedded as a cultural and firm-wide attribute, 
then a firm should become more productive, as waste removal and efficiency leads to time 
availability.  The additional time saved via efficiency (overall productivity) can be spent on core 
competencies for products and services.  Productivity makes firm offerings more attractive 
(quality, cost, performance) and subsequently a country’s competitiveness should move 
positively in relation to its constituent firm performances.  
The attributes of economic freedom, legal integrity, openness, fairness and equitability are 
employed in many macro research endeavors; there is precedence for social science valuation 
according to underlying institutional constructs.  These institutional constructs have been related 
to economic growth, educational levels, R&D and innumerable others.   For the present research, 
and based on the literature study, the inclusion of intellectual property rights, as one institutional 
construct, is suspect.  The question of whether or not “intellectual property” is evident in country 
performance can be analyzed empirically by investigating its impact on innovation.   That 
necessitates a dependent variable to act as a country’s innovation proxy. 
The inference of Ostry (1998) is partially flawed relative to innovation measures.  His research 
concludes that measurement of innovation should be focused on knowledge investment, 
including levels or R&D expenditures, the number of patents, and high technology trade, in 
relation to “flow measure; that is, human resource mobility; cross country publication citations.”  
There is no doubt that an innovation measurement requires investment calculation; however, his 
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inference implies that the innovation-centric investment is one that falls within the research and 
development cost center.  This paper’s thesis submits that innovation inputs should apply to all 
facets of firm operation, which will have spillover effects.  Innovation is knowledge, and 
knowledge has no tangible boundaries.  Certainly, a knowledge investment is justified as a 
measurable component, but that should initially be assessed across the entire value chain; this is 
proposed in the empirical analysis when multifactor productivity will be employed in a proxy 
configuration. 
When a firm mandates a cultural construct of innovation, the expectation is that innovation is 
embraced as a way of life.  If innovation is applied to traditionally-oriented overhead functions 
(Facilities Management, Accounting, Supplier Management; Infrastructure, etc.) the end goal is 
improvement of the intra-firm service catalog for supporting various departments.  As discussed 
in the Enhanced Value Chain Theory section, innovative enhancements are not necessarily 
isolated to R&D expenditures.  If one considers that only the outwardly facing deliverable 
(service or product) is the evidence for innovation, then that assumption claims that only the 
constrained investment within that firm (the dollars identified as R&D) represent, as a proxy, the 
emphasis or level of innovation within.  That might be acceptable in trying to compare “apples to 
apples” across like-kind firms, since the proxy would be conceivably utilized as measuring only 
product/service delivery investment.   But this ignores the endogenous cultural expectations and 
cross-functional behaviors.  Innovation is contagious.  The inspiration for product/service 
improvement is not confined to the R&D cost centers of the firm but is prompted by spillovers, 
both exogenous and endogenous.  If the firm holds innovation as a strategic imperative, 
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embedded and expected in day to day activities, including internal operations, then the proxy of 
R&D expenditures is lacking.    
“In order to understand the exact role that knowledge and therefore 
innovation plays in the economy the measurement of knowledge 
inputs and knowledge outputs is critical.  Our understanding of the 
role of knowledge in economic activity has traditionally been 
guided by the state of the measurement of knowledge. However, 
such data have always been incomplete and, at best, represented 
only a proxy measure reflecting some aspect of the process of 
technological change.”  (Acs, et. al, 2002) 
 
Returning to Ostry (1998), he then delivers an approach aligned with this thesis: the intent should 
be to use an [innovation] indicator that can cut across OECD countries, in order to have a 
normalized comparison. “Neoclassical models recognized technology as the key driver of 
growth, but it was exogenous to the market (manna from heaven). The growth of knowledge 
(which depends on a variety of economic decisions, such as investment in R&D, in human 
capital, in new capital goods, or accumulated in learning by doing, etc.) is central to the new 
model…” (Ostrey, 1988, emphasis mine).   
Kemp (2003) referring to Katz and Shapiro (1994) recognizes that innovation activities evolve 
via network instigations; the resultant innovation influences are not necessarily in pursuit of the 
product development objective.  That is, innovation is even exogenous to project goals.   They 
are factors which assist in development but those ‘helpers’ are behavioral and brainstorming-
related.   They are borrowed from other experiential activities that may or may not be isolated to 
the project requirements and specifications.  In strategic, executive branding, firms determine 
their reputation goals, whether they are product leadership, operational excellence, or customer 
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intimacy (Treacy and Wiersema, 1993).  Firms must intensify innovation behaviors and values, 
and these behaviors are cross-functional phenomena. 
As micro factors in literature are condensed for study, there is unintended disregard of 
innovation as an orchestrated firm-wide, strategic imperative.  Innovation measures might 
include innovation inputs (percentage dedicated time to innovation) and innovative outputs 
(innovative sales); however, there are other inputs that have bearing on the innovation intensity, 
solidifying the proposition that innovation can be an amorphous entity.  This is very challenging 
for measurement efforts. 
The endogenous components of a firm can be summarized as its owned assets and the 
effectiveness and efficiency of labor.  These are measurable and can be consistent across 
industry.  These are also measurable across countries. 
The avenues of research are leading to an innovation indicator that can account for varied and 
sometimes unrelated behaviors, influences activities and inputs.  These innumerable inputs lead 
to the implication that innovation should be measured as a firm output.  Reflecting on the 
original nature of innovation and its objective, research seeks to measure amount of change, 
amount of outputs that cannot be determined simply by an additive or multiplicative assessment 
of labor and assets.    The resultant value to the firm is in the revenue obtained following the 
delivery of the good.   This leads to a productivity measure that may act as a relatively 
unambiguous proxy for innovation, such as overall productivity after accounting for labor and 
capital investments.   What is compelling is that the micro proxies of R&D, or number of new 
products, does not necessarily identify innovation.  Innovation is represented as a collective 
capability for delivering productivity and change. 
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“Anecdotal evidence suggests that new technology, especially information technology over the 
1990s, has substantially contributed to recent improvement in the productivity of firms” (Guellec 
and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2004).  While these authors cite R&D as the ultimate 
source of technological change and economic growth, their qualification, however, is telling: 
“There are different types of R&D, however, and its effect on productivity may work through 
various channels.”  The literature is rife with identification of micro factors and 
acknowledgement of innovation flowing through the firm, without enough qualifications on 
innovation proxy measures employed. 
Innovation is considered a byproduct of intellectual property whose rights are codified by 
institutions.  Institutional measures have been employed in IB literature successfully, valuating 
countries and scoring them.  An institutional assessment will also be applied here. 
The hypothesis for testing intellectual property rights institutions vs. innovation is stated as, 
 H1: Country measured innovation increases without support of intellectual 
property rights institutions.   
Structuring of this hypothesis will require a macro level dependent variable, for innovation, as 
well as macro level independent variables, which will represent the institutional levels of various 
countries. 
Since various institutional factors represent property rights advancement, and since the construct 
of intellectual property rights is submitted as ambiguous, the next hypothesis is stated as,  
H2: Country measured innovation is positively correlated with physical property 
rights institutions in the absence of intellectual property robustness.   
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Structuring of this hypothesis will require the same macro level dependent variable, for 
innovation, and will also require a distinguishing set of independent variables, such that physical 
property rights institutional maturity can be differentiated from intellectual property rights 
institutional maturity. 
The final proposition, recognizing that endogenous and exogenous forces are not necessarily 
under the purview of intellectual property rights constraints, is a contention that innovation’s 
prerequisite is a free flow of information.  This demands an open and equitable institutional 
environment codified into law, excluding intellectual property rights factors.  Correspondingly, 
the final hypothesis is, 
H3: Innovation will increase through robust legal institutions, which minimize 
corruption. 
 
3.3 Methodological Refinement 
The International Property Rights Index (IPRI, 2016) was developed in 2006 under the 
leadership of Hernando de Soto Polar.  As an initiative under the Property Rights Alliance based 
in the United States, the aim of the IPRI is to promote the respect and acknowledgement of 
property rights throughout the world.   Each year the IPRI conducts an analytical study and 
ranking of approximately 130 countries relative to their intellectual property rights progress. 
A set of values was determined and attached to each country according to criteria that 
theoretically underpins the institutional framework for intellectual property rights.  The 
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decomposition of the values includes not only intellectual property rights but also physical 
property rights. 
Intellectual property is often identified as an innovation driver as was stated in much of the 
literature.  Its ostensible existence has mostly been utilitarian in nature.  
To further investigate the soundness of IPRI as valid measures and to address the limited amount 
of testing of property rights versus innovation, this paper will take the next step in assessing IPRI 
values.  A correlation study will seek relationships of physical property versus innovation, 
intellectual property versus innovation, and a combination of both versus innovation.  
The key independent variables (representing institutional property rights levels) include three 
major components that are subsequently detailed in sub-factors, discussed later.   The three areas 
included Legal Framework, Physical property Rights, and Intellectual Property Rights. 
The benefit of the IPRI was significant in its approach.  There are a number of institutions that 
capture property rights, such as the Heritage Foundation (2016) and the Fraser Institute (2016).  
These institutions tend to promote what is termed right of center and libertarian principles, 
respectively, for a perspective of “economic freedom,” including property rights.   Throughout 
their rankings and values, property rights are assessed and included in the country’s overall 
freedom assessment.  Moreover, the property rights that are captured are a bundle, constituting 
both physical property rights and intellectual property rights. 
With the IPRI index and research baseline, an opportunity to separate physical and intellectual 
priority rights has been identified.  Further, should theoretically sound and international business 
related analysis suggest these rankings have scientific validity, first assessed in literature and 
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prior study, then a launching pad is available.  From this, the research can be extended and 
improved upon.  As property rights are touted as a key ingredient for economic development, 
there is less analysis of their impact on innovation.  There lies a challenge here, since the IPRI 
(2016) rankings of property rights embed patents into its analysis.  Thus, patents should correlate 
to other valid proxies for innovation.  In the proposed methodological testing, analysis on 
whether patents are multi-collinear with other property rights variables, shall indicate that patents 
as proxies are not necessarily an appropriate measure for innovation.  
 
3.4 Methodological Challenges and Mitigation 
Multifactor productivity was studied under Hall (2011) and recognized as a convenient, 
accessible and logical measure of change not accounted for by firm inputs: “Multifactor 
productivity is best understood and measured, because of the attention that has been paid by 
economists and statisticians inside and outside governments for the past 50 years.”  This is not to 
say there haven’t been voluminous efforts in studying the measures and identifying concerns.   
Measuring challenges include the difficulty in defining specific real inputs and outputs, 
particularly in the service sector.  (Hall, 2011).  Real inputs and outputs shall be gathered by a 
measurement of multifactor productivity discussed ahead.  However, the service sector concern 
is theoretically justified as is the rationale for demarcating firms per their sectors.  To mitigate 
this ambiguity, empirical analysis will be employed against both holistic views of countries’ 
innovation (the agglomeration of their firms’ performances). 
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Also, criticizing the measurement of factor productivity, Hall (2011) cites the impact of price 
deflators.  Innovation investment may be observed by firm level prices that are due, not so much 
to innovation but, to shifts in market power.   Conventional price indices will not reflect the 
phenomenon of market power dynamics.   Further, benefits allocation due to innovation is 
effected by input and output at the sector level (Hall, 2011).   
To address this, contextualizing for the case at hand, which is a macro view of intellectual 
property forces at the country level, there is a potential that multifactor productivity may 
demonstrate biases; however, to reiterate, this dissertation’s research question is focused at a 
macro level, and concerns itself with property rights.  To moderate the dependent variable of 
innovation, independent variables are used at the country-level, independent of firm-specific, 
market-power. 
As additional conceptual support for this variable, assessing multifactor productivity measures as 
the proxy of innovation, the Bohlen and Beal (1957) diffusion process was considered. This 
process was later enhanced by Rogers (2003) and Moore (2006).  There are several stages of 
product adoption aligned to various customer constituencies and customer profiled.   As shown 
in Figure 6, Adoption Lifecycle.   
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Figure 6, Adoption Lifecycle 
 
Innovators tend to take risks, have the financial liquidity and access to sources of information.  
This would justify innovation impact by financial institutions, and shall be included in the testing 
equation, ensuring that access to funding is included.  The early adopters are more educated that 
late adopters, having higher social status.  While they are more discreet than innovators they tend 
to adopt as a means of maintaining central communication and connections.   
The early majority will tend to wait. They adopt an innovation after a varying degree of time that 
is significantly longer than the innovators and early adopters. Early Majority adopters have 
above average social status, contact with early adopters and seldom hold positions of opinion 
leadership in a system (Rogers, 2003).  The Late Majority is the last to adopt an innovation. 
Unlike some of the previous categories, individuals in this category show little to no opinion 
leadership. These individuals typically have an aversion to change-agents. Laggards typically 
tend to be focused on traditions (Bohlen and Beal, 1957). 
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The adoption life-cycle citation here has a marked intersection for international business and the 
thesis at hand.  In crossing the chasm (Moore, 2003), there is an expectation that not only the 
product innovation will have occurred but the marketing capabilities will be robust and capable.  
This is yet another reference to the nature of innovation as crossing value chain departmental 
demarcations.  An innovation breakthrough in an R&D department cannot be witnessed unless it 
is adopted in the marketplace.  Multifactor productivity is a measure of various capabilities at 
work within a country’s firms, not simply the innovation in the laboratory or departmental silo.  
The importance in viewing the adoption lifecycle is the recognition that the unexplained residual 
(after accounting for capital and labor) is dependent on an orchestrated set of skills and FSAs, 
which deliver innovative products to consumers and which are visible and auspicious enough to 
impact the country’s macro metrics. 
 
3.5 Measuring Innovation 
Per Kneip and Sickles (2010) it may be almost impossible to structurally model the role of 
innovation and the role of efficiency in determining total factor productivity growth.  As Hall 
(2012) referenced Clayton Christenson, there are efficiency innovations, sustaining innovations, 
and empowering innovations, each having varying effects on employment and economic growth.  
In this paper, we are less concerned with the type of innovation, and focused on the holistic 
innovative forces and if they are collectively impacted by property rights.  Innovation for present 
purposes includes efficiency improvements.   
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Per Mefford (1986), there is productivity variability between plants in the same industry.  
Therefore, it is logical to expect variation in plants among different industries.  Primary among 
the variables explaining the variation were management performance, worker skill, and scale and 
learning-by-doing effects.  Mefford (1986) cites management basics as the primary determinant 
for productivity; managers rely on their stock of knowledge and observation.  Some of the 
observation is simply focused on compliance of workers in relation to rote activity.  But beyond 
working a laborer harder in order to output deliverables faster, the innovation process will 
ultimately elicit change and improvement.   
Meyer and Sinani (2009) offer comments that underscore the policy differences among countries 
as prerequisite for inducing spillovers.  “Both low- and high-income economies are likely to 
benefit from FDI spillovers, yet our theoretical discussion suggests that the underlying forces 
creating the spillovers may be quite different. In poor countries demonstration effects may create 
spillovers with little direct interfaces, compared to advanced economies spillovers. This analysis 
emphasizes that policy instruments to facilitate such spillovers may need to be quite different.”   
The authors go on to say that spillovers related to supply chains are not necessarily vertical 
phenomena, within the same industry.  This supports measuring innovation, (advanced by this 
paper as knowledge spillover influences) cross-sector. 
Considering the research surrounding multifactor productivity and innovation as cross-functional 
and fluid, multifactor productivity is justified for use as the innovation proxy – the dependent 
variable. 
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4 Modeling for Empiricism 
In its most basic form, the conceptual model wishes to compare innovation (a proxy) to 
institutional factors of property rights.  If the purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of 
property rights (sans intellectual property and patents), then what is the appropriate proxy for 
innovation?  
4.1 Innovation and Multifactor Productivity 
As an initial consideration, applying a basic Cobb Douglas (1928) approach to the determination 
of innovation, a dependent variable proxy must align to the propositions developed in this study.  
The thrust of this dissertation is that physical property rights are adequate as an institutional 
promoter and supporter for innovation.  It is based on an analytical view of the value chain and 
the recognition that spillovers are major contributions to the innovation process.  Firms drive 
value in a holistic manner; the confining of innovation to a R&D proxy or patent count proxy or, 
for that matter, research/staff expenditures ignores this paper’s enhanced value chain model, 
Figure 5, Enhanced Value Chain Model building upon Porter, recognizing the exogenous and 
endogenous innovative forces onto and throughout the firm’s business processes; dotted lines 
represent the knowledge spillovers from without and within.  If the patent proxy is suspect, per 
this research, then innovation should not necessarily be affected by its absence.  Correlating 
patents with a strong and accepted innovation measure shall assist in analyzing this argument.  
Leveraging the value chain perspective one recognizes that the inputs to all parts of the value 
chain are purchased as labor or other assets.   The outputs of the value chain are the purchased 
goods or services by the consumer.  The purchased good or service (adjusted for markup) is the 
added value.  The added value is priced per its enhanced embodiment of labor and assets.  
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Conceptually, the whole exceeds the sum of the parts owing to the internal processes, designs 
and formulations of the firm.  The unaccounted value (after labor and capital are considered) are 
sound means for identifying firm-specific innovation across its entire value chain.  
A long-standing measure of innovation has been the use of Total Factor Productivity, also 
defined as Multifactor Productivity (MFP) which specifies the output growth not explained by 
accumulation of factor inputs; i.e. the residual of the production function (Danquah and Moral-
Benito, 2012).   MFP can be conceptualized in the Porter value chain as the visible output which, 
in a rational marketplace, shall exceed the value of the inputs.  
MFP represents a standard production function, including its labor and capital components (by 
country and measured over time): 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝐾𝑖𝑡 
where: 
𝐴𝑖𝑡 is a Hicks-netural parameter of technological efficiency; 
𝐹𝑖𝑡 is a country/sector-specific production function assumed to be homogeneous of 
degree one and exhibits decreasing returns to the accumulation of each factor of 
production;  
𝐿𝑖𝑡 is labor 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 is capital   
 
While multifactor productivity is nevertheless identified in the literature as a strong proxy due to 
its universality, the proxy is not without its drawbacks.   Some of the challenges are specified 
below. 
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4.2 Challenges in Model 
Kneip and Sickles (2010) cite problems in decomposing productivity change into its innovation 
and its efficiency components to the point that “it simply may not be possible from purely 
econometric models, no matter how sophisticated, to model structurally the role of innovation 
and the role of in determining TFP growth.”  However, Hall (2001) finds MFP theoretically 
sound as a measure of change in the firm.  Change is instituted and integrated in firm behavior as 
innovation.  Change is incentivized as a potential return, owing to the demands of customers.  
The demands of customers, are observed in their spending and purchasing.   The value of the 
output is what the consumer is willing to pay.   The outputs exceed the inputs by way of 
innovative improvement, be it cost, performance, quality or other objective or subjective values 
the customer seeks. 
According to OECD (2016) MFP reflects the “overall efficiency with which labour and capital 
inputs are used together in the production process. Changes in MFP reflect the effects of changes 
in management practices, brand names, organizational change, general knowledge, network 
effects, spillovers from production factors, adjustment costs, economies of scale, the effects of 
imperfect competition and measurement errors. Growth in MFP is measured as a residual, i.e. 
that part of GDP growth that cannot be explained by changes in labour and capital inputs.” 
Note in the OECD (2016) quotation that change is represented by all manner of factors in a 
firm’s or country’s value chain, particularly “network effects” and “spillovers from production 
factors.”   They do not isolate innovation output (MFP) as a confined view of R&D.  These 
factors are perfectly aligned to activities that occur within the firm’s value chain, holistically.  
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The paper’s supposition is that innovation is the byproduct of firm-wide value chain 
contributions, not a skewed count of product counts or patented inventions. 
MFP is a justifiable and scientifically rational proxy for innovation, from a macro perspective 
and viewed as a country index.  The subsequent and proposed theories will depend on the use of 
MFP and its relationship to physical property rights, intellectual property rights, and institutions. 
Hall (2011) continues his selection of MFP as a robust innovation measure for its simplicity, 
wide span of coverage (country-wise), objectivity and consistency, as it is used by many 
institutions and official bodies of nation-states.  Further it is a normalized function for 
comparison; can be decomposed to regions and sectors is desired; is difficult to manipulate; is 
well understood; is bottom-line efficient, providing a measure of the overall economy (Hall, 
2011). 
4.3 Formalizing the Model 
In studying the byproducts of strong property rights, Mazzarol and Reboud (2007) emphasize the 
types of foci for a vibrant economy.  So do Fraser (2016), Heritage (2016) and PRA (2016).  The 
difference is not in factors that promote economic prosperity, but in their proposed application of 
such: the Mazzarol and Reboud (2007) thesis promotes a more active government policy, 
whereas the PRA, Fraser and Heritage promote a more market-oriented ecosystem.  Regardless 
of which political approach, there is agreement on the types of inputs necessitating an innovative 
and prosperous environment, including legal protections, judicial independence, contract 
enforcement and property rights.   In the Heritage indices, property rights are evaluated in 
context of government recognition of property and its protections.  There is not an enumeration 
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and separation of intellectual vs. physical property rights.   In the Fraser Institute’s economic 
freedom rankings, property rights, including financial assets, are scaled among a continuum from 
property rights protection (under the oversight of a fair and impartial judiciary) and, at the other 
end of the spectrum, little to no recognition of provide property.  The PRA’s IPRI analysis 
considers valuation and ranking of property rights under two paradigms -- physical and 
intellectual.  As the most relevant perspective to uncover the impact of patents, the IPRI 
methodology, as independent variables impacting innovation, is the preferred one for analysis 
and research.   
Analysis via qualitative data is open to criticism and must be undertaken within a formal 
framework and justifiable data observations.  Kraay (2006) highlighted the challenge in his 
paper, reviewing corruption indices and whether indices would deliver a scientifically robust 
analysis of institutional governance dynamics.  Noting Kaufmann, et. al. (2006), assessment 
efforts were conducted in multiple ways: stakeholder views and surveys whereby the 
stakeholders included the following: leaders in their field, NGOs, international actors and public 
officials.  Means for analysis included institutional profile analysis, such as budget management, 
procurement practices and the associated widows of opportunity for corruption, as well as audits 
of projects and deltas between expected outcomes and actual outcomes.  On the surface, these 
approaches seem credible and rational (Francisco, 2015) but were open to calls for objective data 
instead of “soft perception data”.  “Even where objective measures are available, they provide 
only imperfect proxies for real conditions on the ground (of course the same is true for 
perception-based data which has potential problems of its own)” (Kraay, 2006). 
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One means to overcome the problem is via the use of aggregators, data that is sourced across 
multiple perception captures, surveys, and institutional databases, providing additional credibility 
and moderation.  Aggregate indicators allow broader country coverage, a functional summary 
from a vast array of individual indicators; they average out, reducing measurement errors and 
biases of individual sources, and allow for the calculation of explicit margin of error.  This can 
ameliorate the “perception” problems; however, the “error” problem (Francisco, 2015) is 
manifested in suspect confidence intervals, whereby only one source of data will result in a 
larger standard error.  Finally, the “utility” problem is cited as the gap between measurement 
data and solution or implementation.   This is akin to the “so what?” factor – observation data 
that has no actionable response.   It is important that qualitative indices can be grounded in data 
that can help address poor performance. 
The utilization of PRA alliance data (IPRI, 2016) is aimed at satisfying the concerns of 
perception-based metrics.  The data is not only aggregated but also provides granular sub factors.  
The data is sourced from a variety of credible institutions.  Further, the data provides strategy 
opportunities, to implement the granular factors into an overall enterprise plan.  The data also 
provides policy makers strategic means to improve country property rights environments.    
For the strategic practitioner, the metrics are a means to intersect country advnatages with FSAs 
and add value to the firm via avoidance of country shortcomings or leveraging of country 
opportunity.,  
Given the dissertation thesis and question pertaining to innovation as a significant dependency 
on property rights, and given the suspect usage of intellectual property and/or patents as evidence 
of innovation, a conceptual model is offered.  Figure 7, Conceptual Structure for Innovation 
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Dependency on Property Rights Institutions shows the approach for empirically testing the 
innovation to property rights thesis and considered variables.  
Data representing property rights has been investigated at the Fraser Institute 
(www.fraserinstitute.org), the Heritage Foundation (www.heritage.org), the National Center for 
Policy Analysis (www.ncpa.org), among others.  The present challenge in data selection is to 
separate factors and sub factors that are associated with intellectual property.  In order to conduct 
empirical testing for physical property rights vs. intellectual property rights and their interplay, 
then the data sets must be isolated and evaluated.   The Property Rights Alliance pra.org sponsors 
the analysis of property rights with demarcation of the two in its international property rights 
index (IPRI).  The validity of the physical property rights attributes vs. intellectual property 
rights attributes will be studied as a data validation measure. 
Innovation Impact is captured on the left side, as a potential dependent variable, while Property 
Rights Institutional Factors are offered on the right. 
The fundamental assumption of patents being an inordinately strong indicator of country 
innovation is not justifiable based on the permutations of innovative forces, the human necessity 
for innovation and the history of innovation in the absence of patent rights. 
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Figure 7, Conceptual Structure for Innovation Dependency on Property Rights Institutions 
 
Per Figure 7, Conceptual Structure for Innovation Dependency on Property Rights Institutions each 
variable was developed from a set of official data stores, and normalized according to a 0 – 10 
scale; 0 being the lowest value and 10 being the highest, as delineated below.  All data is 
supplied in the appendices of this dissertation. 
 
4.3.1 Innovation Impact Data 
The multifactor productivity values were captured from The Conference Board 2016. The Total 
Economy Database™ (Original Version), November 2016, http://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/.  After removing countries that did not have adequate data 
across the 10 sub value, encapsulated in the three major factors of Legal Framework, Physical 
Property Rights, and Intellectual Property Rights, 74 countries were retained over a nine-year 
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period – 2006 to 2014, inclusive.  The Innovation proxy (multifactor productivity) data is listed 
in Appendix A, Table 5, Innovation data, represented as multifactor productivity values.  For 
future research, countries were associated with region -- North America (NA), Latin America 
(LA), Middle East and Africa (MEA), Western Europe (EU), Eastern Europe (Eastern EU), Asia 
Pacific (APAC).  Also included is an economic classification value – Less Developed (LD) or 
Developed (D), which was used in the empirical testing. 
 
4.3.2 Legal Framework Data 
For Legal and Political framework, sub factors were referenced from these sources: the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index (http://gcr.weforum.org) for Judicial 
Independence; and the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators) for Political Stability, 
Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
The sub factor data is listed in Appendix A, followed by the rollup to the aggregate Legal 
Framework value.   Appendix A, Table 6, Judicial Independence values were captured via 
“experts' answers to the survey question: ‘Is the judiciary in your country independent from 
political influence of members of government, citizens or firms?’" (IPRI, 2016).  The scaling by 
the World Economic Forum was on a 1 – 7 scale; this data was normalized to a 0 – 10 scale.  
Saudi Arabia and Senegal data is missing for 2006; Ecuador data is missing for 2014. 
Appendix A, Table 7, Rule of Law values; normalized from -2.5 to +2.5 range into a 0-10 scale 
was derived from several indicators including the World Bank’s own judiciary assessment, 
respect for law in relations between citizens and the administration, property rights, confidence 
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in the police force, enforceability of contracts, direct financial fraud, law and order, which 
measure the existence of the rule of law (IPRA, 2016).  Survey respondents were asked to  
represent the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and 
grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (IPRI, 
2016).  
Appendix A, Table 8, Political Stability values are assessments of the “likelihood that the 
government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or 
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism” (IPRI, 2016).  The original ratings 
were between   -2.5 to +2.5.  The ratings were normalized by rescaling them to a 0 - 10 scale.  
Pakistan data was unavailable 
Appendix A, Table 9, Control of Corruption values were garnered from survey data, which 
measure the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (IPRI, 2016).  
Note that for Denmark 2006 and 2007, as well as Finland for 2006, the original score from the 
World Bank Group exceeded its upper bound of +2.5, later normalized to above 10.  Since the 
score was approximately within 1% of the upper bound, the score was retained despite it being 
slightly above the maximum of the range. 
These four above sub factors were then averaged, resulting in Appendix A, Table 10, Legal 
Framework aggregate values; average of Judicial Independence, Rule of Law, Political Stability, 
Control of Corruption,   
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4.3.3 Physical Property Rights Data 
For Physical Property Rights assessments, data sources included The World Bank Group – 
Doing Business database (http://www.doingbusiness.org) for Registering Property evaluation; 
and the World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (http://gcr.weforum.org) for 
both Property Rights scoring and Ease of Access to Loans scoring. 
The sub factor data is listed below, which was averaged to an overall aggregate Physical 
Property Rights value. 
The “property rights protection” sub-factor was garnered from survey data where participants 
were asked to comment on property rights in their country, including over financial asset 
protection.  The data is shown in  Appendix A, Table 11, Property Rights Protection.  The scale 
was originally 1 – 7 (from 1 as poorly defined or protected rights, to 7 as well-defined and 
protected rights).  The scale was then normalized to 0 – 10 scale (IPRI, 2016). 
For Property Rights Protection values, data for Ecuador in 2016 was not available. 
For measuring ease of Registering Property (“Registering Ability” in the conceptual framework), 
two considerations are factored into the index -- the number of procedures legally required to 
register physical property and the time spent (in days) in completing the procedures.  The 
calculated values  are shown in the Appendix A, Table 12, Registering Property ratings. The 
values were weighted 30% to the procedure counts and 70% to the number of days.  
Normalization then created a 1 – 10 rating, per the methodology explained in 
http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/ipri2016_comp.  Note again that this calculation 
process was manually duplicated for this dissertation as all years’ data from the Property Rights 
Alliance was not readily available.  The scenario considered for “registering property” was an 
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entrepreneur attempting to purchase land or building in the city (IPRI, 2016).  Data omissions 
included Canada 2006, Cyprus 2006-2008; Luxembourg 2006; Malta 2006-2011; Qatar 2006-
2007; Senegal 2006. 
Data listed in Access to Loans, another Physical Property Rights sub-factor, was captured via 
survey, questioning respondents, “How easy is it to obtain a bank loan in your country with only 
a good business plan and no collateral?”  The data was on a 1 – 7 scale and was then normalized 
to a 0 – 10 scale.  The scores for this factor are shown in Appendix A, Table 13, Access to Loans 
values. 
The rollup of values, an average of the three Physical Property Rights sub factors, are shown in 
the Appendix A, Table 14, Aggregate scores for Physical Property Rights. 
 
4.3.4 Intellectual Property Rights Data 
Intellectual Property Rights data, included in Appendix A, was captured from BSA Software 
Piracy studies (http: / /globalstudy.bsa.org) relative to unlicensed software assessments.  The 
World Economic Forum – Global Competitiveness Report (http://gcr.weforum.org/) provided 
values for intellectual property protection, and patent protection data was captured from Walter 
G. Park’s research at http://fs2.american.edu/wgp and downloadable, as of December 1, 2016 
from    http://fs2.american.edu/wgp/www/patent%20index%201960%20-%202010.xlsx.   
The BSA Global Software Piracy Studies, which identified, on a percentage basis, compliance to 
software licensing rules had available data reports in 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2015.  The values 
were then annualized for the 2006-2014 period; 2009 data was used for 2006-2008; 2011 data 
was used for 2009-2010; 2013 data was used for 2011-2012; 2015 data was used for 2013-2014.  
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As a higher % of non-compliance is perceived as a poor score, the data was normalized to a 0 – 
10 scale, whereby 0 is a low compliance and 10 is a high level of compliance. The resultant 
scores are shown in Appendix A, Table 15, Software License Compliance. 
For intellectual property protection, ratings were based on intellectual property protection and 
anti-counterfeiting measures, where a low score was 1 and a high score was 7.  The values were 
normalized to the  0 – 10 scale.  Countries with missing data included all for 2010, Ecuador 
2014, Saudi Arabia 2006 and Senegal 2006, as seen in Appendix A,  Table 16, Intellectual 
Property Protection scores. 
Patent protection was evaluated using the Park data, which was captured every five years.  2005 
data was duplicated until 2009, and 2010 data was duplicated through 2014, shown in Appendix 
A, Table 17, Patent Protection scores, normalized from 0-5 range into a 0-10 scale.  
Aggregate data for Intellectual Property Rights indices is captured in Appendix A,  Table 16, 
Intellectual Property Protection scores. 
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5 Testing and Results 
The empirical testing within this thesis includes statistical analysis and regression testing of the 
IPRA-similar independent factors.  The conceptualization fits into an empirical approach for 
regression testing of those indices (or their sub factors) against an innovation proxy.   That is, the 
“data points underlying Legal Framework, Physical Property Rights and Intellectual Property 
Rights can be statistically compared and subjected to bi-directional influences and interplay” 
(IPRI, 2015). 
5.1 Statistical Software and Data Normalization 
The statistical analysis software used in this study was EViews v 9.5 Enterprise edition, 
downloaded via eviews.com, IHS Global, Inc. © 1996-2016.   A Principal Component Analysis 
to determine if factors could be better employed was run using SPSS.   
Data was first extracted manually, using Microsoft Excel 365.   The data sources identified 
above were captured individually and at the precise source cited by IPRI (2016); i.e., all data 
formulating the major three measures (IPR, PPR, Legal Framework) was not taken from IPRI 
but, rather, was extracted directly from the sources they cited (e.g., World Bank, BSA, etc.). 
Following the downloads, a macro-enabled methodology was employed to normalize from the 
diverse scales to an overall 0-10 scale, 0 implying poor performance or capability, and 10 
implying optimal capability. 
 Also, as the intent is to determine significance of physical property rights vs. intellectual 
property rights within an institutional framework, the regression and thorough analysis can then 
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be modified by removal of variables constituting Intellectual Property, and retaining only 
Physical Property Rights as well as Legal Framework.   
The data sample (74 countries for IPRI values and MFP values) is extensive enough to determine 
basic correlation and model fit for fixed effects.  Countries were limited to those that had 
virtually all values across the property rights rankings, including sub-values.  The multifactor 
productivity dependent variable was of course a necessity, as well.  
There are three major areas that are challenging under this research: measurements of innovation 
(multifactor productivity) may be biased according to factor endowments of countries not fully 
understood.  Secondly, there may be multi-collinearity concerns as firm behavior may be 
provoked by other ownership, location or internalization factors a la Dunning and their 
independent variable interplay.  And thirdly, the data must be comprehensive.  To address these 
concerns, the study will analyze iteratively-adjusted regressions and comprehensive testing. 
Some challenges to the multifactor productivity measure were recognized as a sectorial 
difference.  In a time-series analysis, change in productivity was noted in manufacturing at a 
higher rate than in financial and business services.  This is theoretically due to the 
implementation of manufacturing process improvements, more readily observable than the 
service industry (Arnaud, et.al.  2011).   Since macro level indicators for dependent and 
independent variables are used, sectors would not be distinguished in the iterations. 
The basic regression Innovation proxy and Property Rights Independent Variables would be 
submitted as follows. 
𝑌𝑖t = β0 + βb1𝑋𝑖t +   β2𝑋𝑖t +   β3𝑋𝑖t +  ε 
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 where:   
𝑌𝑖t is the Multifactor Productivity measure (Innovation proxy); 
β1𝑋𝑖t is the Legal Framework index as calculated from granular variables 
cited in Figure 7; 
β2𝑋𝑖t is the Physical Property Rights index as calculated from granular 
variables cited in Figure 7; 
  𝛽3𝑋𝑖t is the Intellectual Property Rights index as calculated from granular 
variables cited in Figure 7. 
More granular data is also tested; that being, the sub-factors within each of the major three 
categories. 
 
5.2 Empirical Process 
A stepwise methodology for the empirical testing was created to support this dissertation as well 
as provide a guide for follow-on research.   As seen in Figure 8, Empirical approach and 
rationalization for adjustments in variable testing, there were three primary analysis stages 
employed to investigate the data, plus a stage listed for futures.  This flowchart will be 
referenced throughout this section on Testing and Results.  In the early stages of data gathering, 
there were several gaps in the researched data for the planned variables.  To ensure that nearly 
100% balancing was effected, although there were nevertheless some omissions, a total of 74 
countries’ profiles were captured.  
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Figure 8, Empirical approach and rationalization for adjustments in variable testing 
 
As an introductory step, basic descriptive statistic checks were undertaken for standard 
inspection prior to initial regression.  The data distributions are shown in Figure 9 through 
Figure 12. 
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Figure 9, Distribution of Multifactor Productivity across 74 countries 
 
 
 
Figure 10, Legal Framework Distribution 
 
 
 
Figure 11, Physical Property Rights distribution 
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Figure 12, Intellectual Property Rights distribution 
 
The dependent variable MFP shows a normal distribution along with Physical Property Rights, 
which also shows normality.  Some question regarding the data for Intellectual Property and 
Legal Framework is elevated due to an irregular distribution showing.   This is not cause for 
alarm but it does indicate that the country selection analysis may manifest some peculiarities as 
regression testing is executed, and that the qualitative questions deriving the predictors 
(institutional variables) have opportunity for refinement. 
 
5.2.1 Regression Testing 
In the first iteration of tests, cited as Preliminary regressions within Figure 8, Empirical 
approach and rationalization for adjustments in variable testing IPRI data was tested at the 
summary level, summarized into the three major categories initially discussed and proposed by 
the Property Rights Alliance, per Figure 13, Regression of MFP vs. Average scores on Legal 
Framework, Physical Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights.  For the average 
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variables, LF is the Legal Framework; PPR is the Physical Property Rights; IPR is Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
The dependent variable was specified per the model and regressed accordingly.  Results were not 
as significant as expected. 
 
Figure 13, Regression of MFP vs. Average scores on Legal Framework, 
Physical Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights. 
 
The only significant variable in the output was the average level of Physical Property rights.  
Further, this variable showed an unexpected sign, being negatively correlated with multifactor 
productivity (MFP).   Not unexpected, following this output, was a correlation matrix developed 
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from the average variables.  The levels of correlation, Table 1, Extremely High Correlation 
among average score predictors of the IPRI structure, as related to regression testing were 
exceedingly high, and further diminish any credence in the regression output above. 
 
Table 1, Extremely High Correlation among 
average score predictors of the IPRI structure, 
as related to regression testing 
 
Moving away from the questionable categories employed in the first regression, all individual 
sub-factors were tested collectively against the innovation proxy of MFP, going from three 
aggregate variables (the averages) to ten variables.   Recall that, per the conceptual testing 
model, there were four, three, and three, sub-factors applied to Legal Framework, Physical 
Property rights and Intellectual Property Rights, respectively.   Observed in  Figure 14, 
Regression of MFP vs. All Granular Variables per model, which are subsidiaries of the Legal 
Framework, Physical Property Rights, Intellectual Property Rights categories, the ten sub-
factors were analyzed.  It is evident that the qualifying data chosen by Property Rights Alliance, 
relative to multifactor productivity (MFP) can instigate results with problematic significant 
levels.  The overall goodness of fit is not overly compelling (.44 and with adjusted R-squared of 
.34 due to the excessive number of variables); however, econometrically it can be useable.  More 
concerning is that there is no solid reason to explain the erratic behaviors of the signs.  Note in 
the Legal Framework group (LF*), three of four sub-factors are negatively correlated, while only 
the political stability (LF_Stable?) and rule of law (LF_Rule?) factors show a significant impact.   
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Given the plethora of other variables, there is too much uncertainty to consider that this model 
will advance the research accurately. 
 
Figure 14, Regression of MFP vs. All Granular Variables per model, which 
are subsidiaries of the Legal Framework, Physical Property Rights, 
Intellectual Property Rights categories 
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The next steps in the flowchart process, again referencing Figure 8, Empirical approach and 
rationalization for adjustments in variable testing, focused on Factor Restructuring.  This was 
rationalized due to concerns of multicollinearity-- unexpected signs and very high error terms.  
Further underscoring this behavior is the correlation matrix in Table 2, All granular variables 
with mostly high correlations among each other.  The correlation of the ten variables was very 
high, outside of a handful of relationships, particularly in “property registration” and also in 
“access to loans”. 
 
Table 2, All granular variables with mostly high correlations among each other 
 
As the Property Rights Alliance (PRA) had devised a three-pronged index architecture for 
analyzing property rights, with subsidiary variables, there was a basic assumption -- the three 
categories constitute a demarcation of property rights attributes (along with legal or institutional 
frameworks) in a logical and robust manner.  This separation was used to first initiate the 
“averages” regression; meaning the averages of the four Legal Framework variables, averages 
for the three Physical Property Rights subsidiary variables, and averages for the three Intellectual 
Property Rights subsidiary variables.   As the “averages” results were disappointing, and while 
an exhaustive list of the ten variables also showed erraticism, the next approach was to execute a 
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factor analysis of the variables, potentially removing the variables’ impact ambiguity while 
reducing the number of property rights/environment predictors for MFP.   The assumption going 
into the factor analysis suggested that the results would align to the three IPRI categories. 
Employing SPSS, results are included in Appendix B; Principal Component Analysis Output 
delivered only one factor accounting for over 70% of variation. Furthermore, these factor 
groupings were not sustaining the taxonomy of legal framework, intellectual property and 
physical property.   
 
Figure 15, Snapshot of initial SPSS Factor Analysis execution, showing 10-
variable processing and outputting 1 factor 
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As a single factor would not be helpful in the current effort, particularly since the expectation 
was to find some differentiation according to the three-criteria grouping (LF, IPR, PPR), SPSS 
was then employed to develop factors specifically around these categories.  The detailed output 
is captured in Appendix B,  0 SPSS Factor Analysis Configuring Three Factors, whereby each 
property rights category was made to output PCA values that would be regressed.   The outputted 
values are then listed in Appendix B, section 0 PCA Factor Output Data for LF, IPR, PPR.  
Below is a snapshot of the data table. 
 
 
Table 3, Snapshot of PCA Factor Output, which was programmed to generate factors according to the 
IPRI taxonomy -- Legal Framework, Physical Property Rights, Intellectual Property Rights. 
 
The PCA factors were then applied in the original regression structure with MFP as dependent 
variable and factor predictors submitted as Factor_Legal, Factor_PPR, Factor_IPR.   
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Figure 16, Regression following PCA Analysis and Factor construction, 
showing high significance for Legal Framework only 
 
The output of the regression on factors, whose taxonomy matched the original “averages” 
regression per the three property rights categories, illustrated unexpected signs and very high 
significance in the Legal Framework area.   The R-squared goodness of fit was not high and this 
would be seen throughout all the regressions, including the most successful test ahead. 
To this point, the PRA demarcation of property rights variables is becoming more suspect 
relative to innovation predictors.  Recall that PRA’s contention advanced theory that property 
rights delivered strength in economy, advances in GDP, and were core to equitability.  The 
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taxonomy and the data collection advised by the PRA included a separation of physical property 
rights and intellectual property rights.  Complementing their data collections are the academic, 
institutional and commercial rationales, suggesting that intellectual property rights (IPR) will 
advance innovation, discussed throughout the literature review.  This suggestion is challenged by 
the dissertation thesis.  While the empirical testing to this point, illustrated the data sources were 
not significantly supporting an innovation-via-IPR hypothesis, neither were results to this point 
showing innovation supported by physical property rights.  Nevertheless, would the research 
have ended here, the PRA approach is still valuable as a launching point for refining tests. 
Moreover, additional considerations below presented some strength in the variables, constrained 
and filtered per a re-examination.  Referencing the flowchart for the empirical approach, the next 
stage, seen in Figure 8, Empirical approach and rationalization for adjustments in variable 
testing, was to further assess and analyze ambiguity in the qualitative data, from a theoretical 
perspective. The granular variables (all ten) were deconstructed to determine if a more refined 
model could be devised from the observations and data points. 
Under this reexamination, a tabular analysis was created, per Table 4, and used to effect some 
changes in the model, based on international business and institutional theory.  The re-
examination included a rigorous assessment of the attributes embedded in the PRA approach.   
Summarily, the software compliance and patent protection, as well as legal framework and 
average physical property rights were retained as dependent variables.  This is justifiable 
considering the redundancy noted in the various rows and the insistence on separating IP rights 
vs. Physical Property.  Note the fact that software compliance indicates a sector-oriented 
attribute. 
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Table 4, Focused review of variables to modify equation 
The regression tests were repeated using the retained variables, whose results are shown in 
Figure 17, Regression on MFP impact via SW Compliance, Patent Protection, Average Physical 
Property rights and Average Legal Framework scores.  The expected signs for the variables 
were negative for SW Compliance (as the thesis contends that the absence of IP protections will 
on average enhance innovation); negative for Patent Protection; positive for physical property 
rights (as this solidifies ownership in tangible assets); and positive for legal framework (as an 
equitable and consistent environment promotes industriousness and predictability). 
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Figure 17, Regression on MFP impact via SW Compliance, Patent 
Protection, Average Physical Property rights and Average Legal 
Framework scores. 
 
Other than the average physical property rights attribute, which is not quite to the 0.1 
significance level, none of the variables appear to have the impact expected on innovation.  
Considering the conceptual model again, another explanatory variable was considered; i.e. 
overall country risk (or country beta).  Under an additional test, this had no marked improvement 
or explanatory power. 
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As various views were not showing the relationships with innovation as expected, even under 
theoretical reconsideration, there had not yet been a test isolating the country economic status; 
i.e., developed vs. less developed.  During the literature review and methodology, and cited 
inside the conceptual model, the economic maturity of the country could have a justifiable 
impact on innovation.  Firstly, developed countries will have more established, legacy IP 
institutions, whose mature, legal processes could temper sudden shifts in unexplained output.  
Technological change may not move in spikes in such environments, but rather evolve in a 
steady pattern.  Less developed countries may experience higher multifactor productivity effects 
due to a less structured oversight by administrators and their correspondingly smaller 
institutions.  Nevertheless, the exercise to minimize variables in a theoretically sound manner 
still had not shown the expected results until, remarkably, economic maturity was included. 
Shown in Figure 18, Regression of IPR_SW,  Avg_PPR, Avg-LF in  Less Developed countries, 
significance is seen in software compliance (with negative sign), average property rights scores 
(negative sign), and legal framework (positive sign).  The software compliance sign upholds the 
thesis that less regimented control and oversight will result in more innovation, ceteris paribus.  
The legal framework correlation makes sense in supporting a predictable institutional 
environment.  The lack of significance for patent protection shows no effect on innovation.  But 
what of the physical property rights score?  There is significance at the 0.1 p-level, nearly at 
0.05, but the negative sign is unexpected.   
One possibility is that the property rights factor included an emphasis on protection of financial 
assets as well as access to loans.  A mature institutional environment is required for high scores 
in this space and that would not be observed very often in less developed countries.   This would 
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be an opportunity to modify the property rights evaluation criteria and perhaps focus more on 
property rights as a recognition of ownership in capital or real estate rather than debt instruments. 
The dilemma here is that MFP, requires a means to get product to market, and that implies access 
to funding, per the adoption cycle earlier.  More refinement in the physical property rights factor 
should be undertaken. 
 
 
Figure 18, Regression of IPR_SW,  Avg_PPR, Avg-LF in  Less Developed 
countries 
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Concluding the empirical process, both an “all-country” regression was run between MFP and 
patent protection alone.  In Figure 19, Regression on all countries; isolating IPR_Patent 
predictor to MFP with no significant correlation, the thesis continues to be supported; the 
dissertation recommends a limiting of patents as proxies, if not eliminating them, and employing 
patents as proxy only in the most isolated cases of innovation study.  A more thorough 
examination of innovation recognizes that value chain paradigms acknowledge the amorphous 
dynamics influencing the development process.  Thus, patent-citation should be applied in only 
the most constraining of scenarios.  Further, if the constraint is so isolated, then what is the value 
of patents as a true metric when innovation moves in such a fluid context? 
 
Figure 19, Regression on all countries; isolating IPR_Patent predictor to 
MFP with no significant correlation 
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For consistency with the findings that showed sensitivity to a Less Developed country context, a 
final regression showed no significant relationship in patent-regime maturity/enforcement 
relative to MFP --   Figure 20, Regression on Less Developed countries; isolating IPR_Patent 
predictor to MFP with no significant correlation 
 
Figure 20, Regression on Less Developed countries; isolating IPR_Patent 
predictor to MFP with no significant correlation 
 
  
5.2.2 Hypotheses Results and Conclusions 
The regression results using specified predictors from all three major categories of LF, PPR, IPR 
(Figure 18, Regression of IPR_SW,  Avg_PPR, Avg-LF in  Less Developed countries) provided a 
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balanced view of predictors that rationally affect multifactor productivity, this dissertation’s  
proxy for innovation. Within that regression view, two of the three hypotheses offered in this 
thesis are supported with limitations, while one is not supported. 
H1: Country measured innovation increases without support of intellectual 
property rights institutions.   
This hypothesis was supported.  When countries are limited to Less Developed status, the 
institutional dynamics relating to innovation in the conceptual and the formally tested model 
show different behavior as compared to all countries including Developed countries.  Developed 
country-only results were not illustrated in the Testing section for brevity but they exhibited no 
marked difference compared to the ”all-country” testing.  Most notably, there was no correlation 
between Patent Protection and Innovation for this macro scenario among Less Developed 
Countries. 
Limited to Less Developed countries, innovation (measured by MFP proxy) increases without 
support of intellectual property institutions.  Regression testing showed reductions in software 
compliance improved MFP, while patent protection was neutral. 
 
H2: Country measured innovation is positively correlated with physical property 
rights institutions in the absence of intellectual property robustness.   
This hypothesis was not supported.  As discussed in the testing section, the predictor variable 
(average property rights factors) was negatively correlated at a moderately significant level. 
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H3: Innovation will increase through robust legal institutions, which minimize 
corruption. 
Legal institutions had a highly significant correlation (positively and at the 0.01 p-level) with 
innovation.  This was only illustrated for Less Developed countries. 
Notably in this empirical test, the sector attribute was witnessed by the IPR_SW variable.  This 
predictor was isolated to the software industry and included both copyrights and patent 
implications.   Per the testing for Less Developed countries, innovation is effected by less 
oversight, at the macro level, in the space of software development and software licensing 
compliance.   Further study should be undertaken to minimize other noise or disruptive interplay, 
and to confine MFP within the software domain.  As software falls within the Information and 
Commutation Technology (ICT) sector, firms can be assessed intra-country and then 
internationally, in a stepwise fashion.    
Finally, measures for innovation have been focused on patent proxies, R&D spending proxies, 
technical labor measurements, and other metrics which do not necessarily, in and of themselves, 
determine the innovativeness of a country.  As proxies are sought for scientific and econometric 
analysis of innovation, the recognition of value chain dynamics and information flows may be a 
more robust means for measuring, at both the macro level (the focus of this current thesis) as 
well as the firm level (for future researchers and practitioners).  
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6 Summary  
In a literature review by Edison, Ali and Torkar (2013) the authors cited innovation measures for 
the software industry and stated that a consistent perspective of innovation was absent.   This is 
at the core of the innovation metric dilemma.  When innovation’s genesis can stem from a 
virtually infinite number of ideas, exchanges, encounters, through collaboration, study, or even 
accident, then how do we agree on a genuinely scientific metric? 
Throughout the social sciences, the patent has been frequently used as a proxy for innovation.  
This implicitly encourages a policymaking influence, continued support of intellectual property 
institutions.  Yet there are acknowledgements throughout the research, including by those who 
employ the patent metric, that validity of the patent as innovation-unit-of-measure is suspect, and 
that further research in innovation is necessary to refine measurements and their proxies.   This 
research intended to contribute to the innovation discipline and add a baseline simplicity to the 
hyper granular arguments, which often overlook the holistic, value chain impact. 
Theory advanced in this dissertation can be summarized as follows. Innovation is the output of 
multiple internal dynamics in a firm.  While this is generally accepted in IB literature and 
research, the employment of questionable proxies (representing innovation) continues.  In the 
case of this thesis, multifactor productivity (MFP) was the proxy of choice, rationalized by way 
of value chain processes.  MFP is justified as a consistent and globally recognized measure, 
applicable to micro perspectives as well as macro perspectives, the paradigm of this research.  
Adoption dynamics are also key to embracing the holistic influences of innovation, and MFP is 
influenced by the penetration of new products and services in the marketplace.  “Crossing the 
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chasm” is dependent on the innovative differentiators of firms as well as the acceptance of their 
change and value.   
Intellectual Property (IP) is an institutional construct implicitly advanced for competitiveness in 
countries and firms.  But the ubiquitous information explosion makes control of operationalized 
ideation extremely challenging, especially since innovation is a flowing and evolving force. Prior 
measures of innovation, such as patent proxies, are a flawed measure of innovation due to their 
outwardly facing innovation criteria, and the fact that many innovative firms find success in non-
intellectual property environments.  Further, as innovation is difficult to measure, often being 
quantified simply by means of a proxy (i.e., patent applications; R&D spend by country, new 
product offerings), there is little standardization on innovation as a quantifiable metric. 
Throughout the literature review and the methodology sections, the intertwined drivers of 
innovation were examined and analyzed.  To research international business (IB) innovation 
studies and to align them with the IB Strategy discipline, an empirical model was utilized to 
underscore the fluid nature of innovation and to call for more specificity in measurements.  
This research contended that property rights are justifiable as an innovation promoter; however, 
this is limited to physical property rights.   This was not significantly evident in this empirical 
analysis.  However, there was empirical evidence that innovation thrived when software 
compliance was diminished.  Also, there was no significant evidence that patent regimes had any 
effect in promoting innovation. 
Innovation has become a buzzword, often without specificity, lacking granular delineation nor 
appropriate contextualization.  It is bandied about by institutions (academic, governmental, 
commercial) who cite it as a competitive advantage, which must be embedded in a firm’s identity 
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and ownership.  Ignoring its importance shall be destructive to a company’s or country’s 
competitive future.   
For the large firm, the MNC, an enormous amount of capital is spent in protecting intellectual 
property under the Legal function of the organization.  Investment in legal processes is 
undertaken to ensure the intellectual intangible property of the firm is protected and cannot be 
appropriated/implemented by a competitor.  The institutional power of government is employed 
and advanced to provide patents, copyrights, trade secrets, etc., for the protection of firms.   But 
from the firm’s point of view, questions should be pondered.  Is the enterprise best served by 
investing its resources in intellectual property pursuits, lobbying, legal challenges and the like, or 
is the firm wasting its resources when it could employ that energy to develop better ways of 
manufacturing, faster ways to reach markets, more effective ways to develop brand and 
credibility? 
If firms are, by necessity, required to innovate to remain competitive, are they instead distracted 
by the resources expended in legal processes vs. processes that are focused on the core 
competency and offerings of the firm?   Are resources better spent on being innovative and 
competitive?    A standard assumption in technology opines that innovation will not take place 
without a patent, and studies are concentrated on the optimal length and breadth of patent 
protection (Boldrin and Levine, 2008).   In many cases the assumption that patents are necessary 
for innovation is not intended as an empirical principle, but accepted as fact.  Within this 
paradigm, policy makers and legislatures have been persuaded to grant exclusive rights to 
innovation by way of artificial extra-legal constructs -- IP.   
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The aim of this research is to reexamine not only the view of value chain as conduit for 
innovation, breaking barriers and silos, but to further advance ideas that innovation does not 
depend on a patent construct.   Follow on research should isolate this paradigm to specific 
sectors, first considering whether the Legal Framework, PPR, and IPR taxonomy is still 
appropriate, or if PPR should be initially filtered.   Further, multifactor productivity (MFP) was 
implemented as the innovation proxy to determine its sensitivity to property rights.  As MFP was 
analyzed and described as a robust and rational measure of innovation, still useful after decades 
of economic and business research, there is nevertheless continuing opportunity to assess its 
measurement applicability in the fluid and dynamic concept of innovation.   
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Appendix A 
Tables in Appendix A represent the dependent variables for 74 countries, and the independent 
variables, which were regressed according to the empirical process specified in Section 5, 
Testing and Results. 
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Innovation Data (MFP) Dependent Variable 
 
Table 5, Innovation data, represented as multifactor productivity values 
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Legal Framework Data (LF) 
 
Table 6, Judicial Independence values, normalized from a 1-7 range into a 0-10 scale 
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Table 7, Rule of Law values; normalized from -2.5 to +2.5 range into a 0-10 scale 
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Table 8, Political Stability values, normalized from -2.5 to +2.5 range into a 0-10 scale 
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Table 9, Control of Corruption values, normalized from -2.5 to +2.5 range into a 0-10 scale 
John Chambers  December 12, 2016  
SNHU; Dissertation   
  
The Obsolescence of Patent Proxies as Country and Firm Innovation Measures  Page 121 of 166 
 
 
Table 10, Legal Framework aggregate values; average of Judicial Independence, Rule of Law, Political 
Stability, Control of Corruption,  
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Physical Property Rights Data (PPR) 
 
Table 11, Property Rights Protection, normalized from a 1-7 range to a 0-10 scale 
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Table 12, Registering Property ratings 
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Table 13, Access to Loans values, normalized from a 1-7 range to a 0-10 scale 
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Table 14, Aggregate scores for Physical Property Rights; average of Property Rights, Registering 
Property, and Access to Loans 
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Intellectual Property Rights Data (IPR) 
 
Table 15, Software License Compliance, normalized and inverted from % to 0-10 scale 
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Table 16, Intellectual Property Protection scores, normalized from a 1-7 range into a 0-10 scale 
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Table 17, Patent Protection scores, normalized from 0-5 range into a 0-10 scale 
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Table 18, Aggregate Intellectual Property Rights score; average of Software License Compliance, 
Intellectual Property Protection, and Patent Protection 
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Appendix B 
Following a Principal, Component Analysis, SPSS delivered one factor only, not distinguishing 
the 10 scores into the associations of Legal Framework , IP Rights, and Property Rights, nor any 
other significant grouping. 
Following the initial process, and considering the IPRI taxonomy of the three major property 
rights areas (LF, IPR, PPR), three factors were manually created and grouped.  The results of the 
second PCA is shown in 0, including outputted PCA values, for use in regression. 
Principal Component Analysis Output 
Factor Analysis SPSS output     
 Notes     
Output Created 12/3/2016 
0:46 
    
Comments       
Input Active Dataset DataSet0    
` Filter <none>    
 Weight <none>    
 Split File <none>    
 N of Rows in 
Working Data 
File 
666    
Missing Value 
Handling 
Definition of 
Missing 
MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined missing 
values are treated as missing. 
 Cases Used LISTWISE: Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax  FACTOR    
  /VARIABLES Judind  Rulelaw  ConCor  PolSta  PR  RegProp  AccessLoan  SW  
IP  PatentPro 
  /MISSING LISTWISE     
  /ANALYSIS Judind Rulelaw ConCor PolSta PR RegProp AccessLoan SW IP 
PatentPro 
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  /PRINT INITIAL ROTATION FSCORE    
  /PLOT EIGEN      
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25)    
  /EXTRACTION PC     
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25)     
  /ROTATION QUARTIMAX     
  /SAVE REG(ALL)     
  /METHOD=CORRELATION.     
      
Resources Processor Time 00 00:00:00.829   
 Elapsed Time 00 00:00:00.607   
 Maximum 
Memory 
Required 
14376 (14.039K) bytes   
Variables 
Created 
FAC1_1 Component score 1   
      
[DataSet0]       
Communalities      
 Initial     
Judind 1     
Rulelaw 1     
ConCor 1     
PolSta 1     
PR 1     
RegProp 1     
AccessLoan 1     
SW 1     
IP 1     
PatentPro 1     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
      
 Total Variance Explained    
  Initial Eigenvalues   
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative %  
1 7.279 72.788 72.788   
2 0.837 8.37 81.158   
3 0.729 7.293 88.452   
4 0.406 4.062 92.514   
5 0.334 3.339 95.853   
6 0.134 1.345 97.198   
7 0.12 1.196 98.393   
8 0.068 0.677 99.07   
9 0.064 0.637 99.708   
10 0.029 0.292 100   
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Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
      
Component Matrix(a)     
      
a. 1 components extracted.     
      
Rotated Component Matrix(a)     
      
a. Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
      
      
Component Score Coefficient Matrix    
 Component     
 1     
Judind 0.125     
Rulelaw 0.133     
ConCor 0.132     
PolSta 0.113     
PR 0.128     
RegProp 0.069     
AccessLoan 0.095     
SW 0.126     
IP 0.13     
PatentPro 0.103     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.    
 Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization.   
 Component Scores.     
      
Component Score Covariance Matrix    
Component 1     
1 1     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.     
 Rotation Method: Quartimax with Kaiser Normalization.    
 Component Scores.      
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SPSS Factor Analysis Configuring Three Factors 
Factor Analysis – Legal Framework Factor 
 
 
Notes 
Output Created 06-DEC-2016 14:48:39 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\botao.an\AppData\Local\Microsoft
\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\Q79L49GN\Untitled1.sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data File 666 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined 
missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used LISTWISE: Statistics are based on cases 
with no missing values for any variable 
used. 
Syntax FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES Judind Rulelaw ConCor 
PolSta 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS Judind Rulelaw ConCor 
PolSta 
  /PRINT INITIAL ROTATION FSCORE 
  /PLOT EIGEN ROTATION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.13 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.12 
Maximum Memory Required 3008 (2.938K) bytes 
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Warnings 
Only one component was extracted. Component plots cannot be produced. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial 
Judind 1.000 
Rulelaw 1.000 
ConCor 1.000 
PolSta 1.000 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3.503 87.575 87.575 
2 .366 9.139 96.714 
3 .092 2.309 99.023 
4 .039 .977 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component 
Matrixa 
 
a. 1 
components 
extracted. 
 
 
Rotated 
Component 
Matrixa 
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a. Only one 
component 
was 
extracted. 
The solution 
cannot be 
rotated. 
 
 
Component Score 
Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
Judind .260 
Rulelaw .280 
ConCor .279 
PolSta .248 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Component Score 
Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 
1 1.000 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization. 
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Factor Analysis Physical Property Rights (PPR) Factor 
 
Notes 
Output Created 06-DEC-2016 14:56:11 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\botao.an\AppData\Local\Micro
soft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\Q79L49GN\Untitled1.
sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
666 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined 
missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used LISTWISE: Statistics are based on 
cases with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES PR RegProp 
AccessLoan 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS PR RegProp AccessLoan 
  /PRINT INITIAL ROTATION FSCORE 
  /PLOT EIGEN ROTATION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) 
ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /SAVE REG(ALL) 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.14 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.09 
Maximum Memory Required 2184 (2.133K) bytes 
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Variables Created FAC1_2 Component score 1 
 
 
Warnings 
Only one component was extracted. Component plots cannot be produced. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial 
PR 1.000 
RegProp 1.000 
AccessLoan 1.000 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 1.927 64.244 64.244 
2 .775 25.841 90.085 
3 .297 9.915 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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a. Only one 
component 
was 
extracted. 
The solution 
cannot be 
rotated. 
 
 
Component Score 
Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
PR .463 
RegProp .321 
AccessLoan .449 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
 
 
Component Score 
Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 
1 1.000 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization.   
 Component Scores. 
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Factor Analysis Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Factor 
 
Notes 
Output Created 06-DEC-2016 14:56:58 
Comments  
Input Data C:\Users\botao.an\AppData\Local\Micro
soft\Windows\Temporary Internet 
Files\Content.IE5\Q79L49GN\Untitled1.
sav 
Active Dataset DataSet1 
Filter <none> 
Weight <none> 
Split File <none> 
N of Rows in Working Data 
File 
666 
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing MISSING=EXCLUDE: User-defined 
missing values are treated as missing. 
Cases Used LISTWISE: Statistics are based on 
cases with no missing values for any 
variable used. 
Syntax FACTOR 
  /VARIABLES SW IP PatentPro 
  /MISSING LISTWISE 
  /ANALYSIS SW IP PatentPro 
  /PRINT INITIAL ROTATION FSCORE 
  /PLOT EIGEN ROTATION 
  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) 
ITERATE(25) 
  /EXTRACTION PC 
  /CRITERIA ITERATE(25) 
  /ROTATION VARIMAX 
  /SAVE REG(ALL) 
  /METHOD=CORRELATION. 
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.14 
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.11 
Maximum Memory Required 2184 (2.133K) bytes 
Variables Created FAC1_2 Component score 1 
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Warnings 
Only one component was extracted. Component plots cannot be produced. 
 
 
Communalities 
 Initial 
SW 1.000 
IP 1.000 
PatentPro 1.000 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis. 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.532 84.400 84.400 
2 .365 12.173 96.573 
3 .103 3.427 100.000 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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a. Only one 
component 
was 
extracted. 
The solution 
cannot be 
rotated. 
 
 
Component Score 
Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 
SW .381 
IP .361 
PatentPro .346 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
 
 
Component Score 
Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 
1 1.000 
Extraction Method: 
Principal Component 
Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax 
with Kaiser Normalization.   
 Component Scores. 
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PCA Factor Output Data for LF, IPR, PPR 
Year Country Region Class MFP Factor_Legal Factor_Phys Factor_IPR 
2006 Algeria MEA LD -5.095 -1.03474 -1.90879 -1.31998 
2007 Algeria MEA LD 2.810 -1.00222 -1.80926 -1.29492 
2008 Algeria MEA LD -3.205 -1.10119 -2.14324 -1.44209 
2009 Algeria MEA LD -2.977 -1.20085 -2.27275 -1.37528 
2010 Algeria MEA LD -0.653 -1.19758 -1.29778 NA 
2011 Algeria MEA LD 1.458 -1.28574 -1.68115 -1.54584 
2012 Algeria MEA LD -1.783 -1.26108 -2.12603 -1.6644 
2013 Algeria MEA LD -2.518 -1.07271 -1.51118 -1.59249 
2014 Algeria MEA LD 4.383 -1.07763 -1.22621 -1.38701 
2006 Argentina LA LD 2.818 -0.89879 -1.15058 -0.74859 
2007 Argentina LA LD 2.960 -0.88471 -1.10815 -0.80636 
2008 Argentina LA LD -1.188 -0.97432 -1.03884 -0.85115 
2009 Argentina LA LD -4.352 -0.98873 -1.423 -0.83146 
2010 Argentina LA LD 5.030 -0.87586 -1.67374 NA 
2011 Argentina LA LD 0.401 -0.80145 -1.72296 -0.84852 
2012 Argentina LA LD -3.699 -0.92672 -1.82549 -0.87002 
2013 Argentina LA LD -0.065 -0.91713 -1.90363 -0.90143 
2014 Argentina LA LD -1.875 -1.02335 -1.81405 -0.87477 
2006 Australia APAC D -1.459 1.29057 1.5433 1.23684 
2007 Australia APAC D -0.347 1.34353 1.57487 1.26332 
2008 Australia APAC D -1.273 1.36999 1.59908 1.27043 
2009 Australia APAC D -1.077 1.3325 1.26307 1.28624 
2010 Australia APAC D -0.932 1.31167 0.89492 NA 
2011 Australia APAC D -1.244 1.30143 0.64845 1.16144 
2012 Australia APAC D 0.336 1.2845 0.61143 1.16624 
2013 Australia APAC D -0.591 1.18482 0.43664 1.18005 
2014 Australia APAC D 0.229 1.28052 0.45122 1.23018 
2006 Austria EU D 1.949 1.31466 1.53398 1.22015 
2007 Austria EU D 1.781 1.44863 1.57952 1.30778 
2008 Austria EU D -0.344 1.41746 1.51815 1.40039 
2009 Austria EU D -2.364 1.2906 1.13937 1.3689 
2010 Austria EU D 1.046 1.19259 0.89729 NA 
2011 Austria EU D 0.721 1.11991 0.8126 1.20677 
2012 Austria EU D 0.149 1.08374 0.788 1.20979 
2013 Austria EU D -0.129 1.10857 0.71376 1.20979 
2014 Austria EU D -0.552 1.11214 0.60971 1.21725 
2006 Bangladesh APAC LD -0.388 -1.5663 -1.10967 -2.19831 
2007 Bangladesh APAC LD -0.822 -1.46936 -1.12223 -2.24523 
2008 Bangladesh APAC LD -0.696 -1.32098 -1.17641 -2.2191 
2009 Bangladesh APAC LD -0.294 -1.28818 -1.14882 -2.07363 
2010 Bangladesh APAC LD 0.235 -1.26905 -1.07192 NA 
2011 Bangladesh APAC LD 0.512 -1.28445 -0.95316 -2.15936 
2012 Bangladesh APAC LD 0.113 -1.34839 -1.07332 -2.14709 
2013 Bangladesh APAC LD 0.035 -1.48426 -1.22326 -2.05975 
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2014 Bangladesh APAC LD 0.814 -1.31108 -1.48361 -2.08339 
2006 Belgium EU D 0.227 0.7542 0.7685 1.30429 
2007 Belgium EU D 0.719 0.80875 0.79819 1.41271 
2008 Belgium EU D -1.436 0.84953 0.83925 1.3601 
2009 Belgium EU D -2.026 0.86053 0.50087 1.28595 
2010 Belgium EU D 1.614 0.84774 0.39243 NA 
2011 Belgium EU D -0.521 0.92578 0.25357 1.22199 
2012 Belgium EU D -0.816 0.91242 0.1369 1.27016 
2013 Belgium EU D -0.293 0.97452 0.04904 1.25937 
2014 Belgium EU D 0.126 0.9673 -0.01394 1.27252 
2006 Bolivia LA LD 2.093 -1.16708 -1.47607 -1.48117 
2007 Bolivia LA LD 1.339 -1.14445 -1.36116 -1.45202 
2008 Bolivia LA LD 1.806 -1.22356 -1.59355 -1.49646 
2009 Bolivia LA LD 0.028 -1.27846 -1.82191 -1.49137 
2010 Bolivia LA LD -0.505 -1.13997 -1.75075 NA 
2011 Bolivia LA LD 0.140 -1.02055 -1.25575 -1.31038 
2012 Bolivia LA LD -0.073 -1.06323 -0.69596 -1.12108 
2013 Bolivia LA LD 1.567 -1.00796 -0.58916 -1.15729 
2014 Bolivia LA LD -0.001 -0.98641 -0.57117 -1.11854 
2006 Brazil LA LD 1.249 -0.7407 -0.66246 -0.44861 
2007 Brazil LA LD 3.156 -0.72353 -0.6357 -0.46141 
2008 Brazil LA LD 1.576 -0.53396 -0.37983 -0.47901 
2009 Brazil LA LD -0.719 -0.43908 -0.54059 -0.47696 
2010 Brazil LA LD 2.978 -0.4068 -0.69253 NA 
2011 Brazil LA LD 0.237 -0.36782 -0.49963 -0.40563 
2012 Brazil LA LD -0.679 -0.39569 -0.38656 -0.32476 
2013 Brazil LA LD 0.311 -0.47741 -0.61065 -0.27687 
2014 Brazil LA LD -2.153 -0.54513 -1.65316 -0.36254 
2006 Bulgaria EU LD 0.701 -0.55108 -0.65571 -0.61009 
2007 Bulgaria EU LD 0.779 -0.54372 -0.48391 -0.5685 
2008 Bulgaria EU LD -1.749 -0.54665 -0.28202 -0.54681 
2009 Bulgaria EU LD -4.849 -0.52 -0.80943 -0.57371 
2010 Bulgaria EU LD 0.500 -0.50463 -1.11043 NA 
2011 Bulgaria EU LD 1.266 -0.53468 -0.97793 -0.48298 
2012 Bulgaria EU LD -0.013 -0.52205 -0.77048 -0.45561 
2013 Bulgaria EU LD 0.111 -0.64653 -0.77129 -0.43943 
2014 Bulgaria EU LD -0.158 -0.70178 -0.94048 -0.44601 
2006 Cameroon MEA LD -0.743 -1.2762 -1.11568 -1.11713 
2007 Cameroon MEA LD -1.149 -1.29025 -1.07346 -1.09633 
2008 Cameroon MEA LD -1.527 -1.32571 -0.93772 -1.2028 
2009 Cameroon MEA LD -2.196 -1.26665 -1.05048 -1.32212 
2010 Cameroon MEA LD -1.350 -1.2882 -1.06768 NA 
2011 Cameroon MEA LD -0.058 -1.2831 -1.00126 -1.23924 
2012 Cameroon MEA LD 0.580 -1.34562 -0.76538 -1.21844 
2013 Cameroon MEA LD 1.513 -1.35339 -0.72414 -1.19516 
2014 Cameroon MEA LD 1.836 -1.33037 -0.76275 -1.12388 
2006 Canada NA D -0.735 1.21416 NA 1.18213 
2007 Canada NA D -1.434 1.28142 1.02283 1.2024 
2008 Canada NA D -1.566 1.34336 1.20419 1.1704 
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2009 Canada NA D -1.946 1.3811 0.89277 1.2213 
2010 Canada NA D 0.721 1.33996 0.69257 NA 
2011 Canada NA D 0.515 1.35605 0.69 1.22524 
2012 Canada NA D -0.670 1.34943 0.75517 1.22489 
2013 Canada NA D 0.066 1.28943 0.6632 1.27994 
2014 Canada NA D 0.562 1.34353 0.72995 1.30411 
2006 Chile LA D -0.534 0.51651 0.66171 0.0955 
2007 Chile LA D -0.964 0.49452 0.73953 0.0955 
2008 Chile LA D -3.576 0.55082 0.70917 -0.02519 
2009 Chile LA D -4.449 0.64487 0.57406 0.0348 
2010 Chile LA D -1.283 0.83408 0.34685 NA 
2011 Chile LA D -0.437 0.8141 0.24354 0.15959 
2012 Chile LA D 0.716 0.77312 0.3697 0.18305 
2013 Chile LA D -0.648 0.75819 0.2974 0.23863 
2014 Chile LA D -1.124 0.77201 0.26055 0.26405 
2006 China APAC LD 4.672 -0.85919 -0.22208 -0.57841 
2007 China APAC LD 6.078 -0.82648 -0.04012 -0.52545 
2008 China APAC LD 2.461 -0.70562 0.2764 -0.38858 
2009 China APAC LD 0.901 -0.66343 0.38569 -0.26745 
2010 China APAC LD 1.853 -0.73522 0.48431 NA 
2011 China APAC LD 1.730 -0.73535 0.53517 -0.22178 
2012 China APAC LD 0.585 -0.73675 0.45996 -0.24329 
2013 China APAC LD 0.813 -0.6702 0.49765 -0.20767 
2014 China APAC LD 0.777 -0.63508 0.33202 -0.20518 
2006 Colombia LA LD 1.867 -1.06457 -0.67402 -0.36406 
2007 Colombia LA LD 1.175 -1.00241 -0.56792 -0.38361 
2008 Colombia LA LD -1.141 -0.96368 -0.46401 -0.42147 
2009 Colombia LA LD -1.398 -1.06734 -0.84054 -0.47129 
2010 Colombia LA LD -0.205 -1.01875 -0.73337 NA 
2011 Colombia LA LD 0.889 -0.90056 -0.52952 -0.41683 
2012 Colombia LA LD -0.473 -1.05545 -0.62966 -0.40368 
2013 Colombia LA LD 1.086 -1.06358 -0.76599 -0.40457 
2014 Colombia LA LD 0.280 -1.02263 -0.76578 -0.4163 
2006 CostaRica LA LD 3.595 0.27242 -0.33483 -0.59522 
2007 CostaRica LA LD 0.345 0.23245 -0.23777 -0.62668 
2008 CostaRica LA LD -2.856 0.22689 -0.08589 -0.69049 
2009 CostaRica LA LD -1.513 0.38646 -0.25273 -0.62816 
2010 CostaRica LA LD 0.919 0.38712 -0.64207 NA 
2011 CostaRica LA LD -0.257 0.23592 -0.7838 -0.56604 
2012 CostaRica LA LD -0.650 0.24602 -0.5058 -0.53049 
2013 CostaRica LA LD 1.040 0.29529 -0.40933 -0.49786 
2014 CostaRica LA LD -1.280 0.34894 -0.48876 -0.44436 
2006 Cyprus EU D 1.447 0.61723 NA 0.0123 
2007 Cyprus EU D -0.622 0.59553 NA 0.02865 
2008 Cyprus EU D -1.221 0.73605 NA 0.12232 
2009 Cyprus EU D -3.585 0.59277 0.6205 0.18664 
2010 Cyprus EU D -0.517 0.64334 0.38814 NA 
2011 Cyprus EU D -0.462 0.57917 0.39598 -0.10286 
2012 Cyprus EU D -0.848 0.58707 0.09708 -0.15317 
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2013 Cyprus EU D -2.135 0.49412 -0.44674 -0.10855 
2014 Cyprus EU D -0.553 0.46156 -0.77381 -0.11797 
2006 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D 4.644 0.26097 NA 0.45693 
2007 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D 2.389 0.24656 0.00725 0.47435 
2008 Czech Eastern EU D -0.799 0.28526 0.22561 0.49034 
2009 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D -4.873 0.24542 0.15234 0.55871 
2010 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D 1.107 0.24047 -0.17967 NA 
2011 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D 0.741 0.2618 -0.37243 0.48005 
2012 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D -1.139 0.22493 -0.36189 0.5092 
2013 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D -1.032 0.23801 -0.26131 0.50832 
2014 CzechRepublic Eastern EU D 0.742 0.29213 -0.03495 0.53942 
2006 Denmark EU D 0.338 1.53638 1.79777 1.54833 
2007 Denmark EU D -1.235 1.5917 1.8266 1.59206 
2008 Denmark EU D -2.503 1.56166 1.80469 1.56718 
2009 Denmark EU D -3.893 1.54248 1.19314 1.48452 
2010 Denmark EU D 2.944 1.50533 0.61373 NA 
2011 Denmark EU D 0.006 1.57031 1.02528 1.45697 
2012 Denmark EU D 0.432 1.38957 0.59267 1.28847 
2013 Denmark EU D -1.654 1.43871 0.46436 1.20795 
2014 Denmark EU D 0.125 1.51485 0.59115 1.28722 
2006 Dominican LA LD 4.634 -0.84157 -0.75522 -1.31033 
2007 Dominican LA LD 2.467 -0.81335 -0.64939 -1.26216 
2008 Dominican LA LD -2.351 -0.84998 -0.65897 -1.21808 
2009 Dominican LA LD -1.188 -0.83685 -0.79245 -1.21208 
2010 Dominican LA LD 2.491 -0.92494 -0.72234 NA 
2011 Dominican LA LD -1.779 -0.95573 -0.83557 -1.26983 
2012 Dominican LA LD -0.921 -0.90041 -0.75615 -1.20211 
2013 Dominican LA LD 1.865 -0.91331 -0.55377 -1.13723 
2014 Dominican LA LD 2.673 -0.86351 -0.65917 -1.06684 
2006 Ecuador LA LD 1.134 -1.45787 -1.1811 -0.74616 
2007 Ecuador LA LD 1.061 -1.39927 -1.13781 -0.71239 
2008 Ecuador LA LD 4.276 -1.39387 -1.367 -0.78118 
2009 Ecuador LA LD -0.013 -1.42954 -1.19325 -0.82877 
2010 Ecuador LA LD 2.583 -1.38923 -1.28707 NA 
2011 Ecuador LA LD 4.277 -1.34031 -1.18709 -0.65149 
2012 Ecuador LA LD 2.111 -1.23589 -0.95187 -0.62359 
2013 Ecuador LA LD 1.351 -0.92972 -0.49305 -0.42997 
2014 Ecuador LA LD -0.404 -1.36336 NA NA 
2006 Egypt MEA LD 0.565 -0.6173 -0.73538 -0.68361 
2007 Egypt MEA LD -3.337 -0.53737 -0.59754 -0.67241 
2008 Egypt MEA LD -1.219 -0.48019 -0.56024 -0.63455 
2009 Egypt MEA LD -1.131 -0.62689 -0.42247 -0.58977 
2010 Egypt MEA LD -0.087 -0.74529 -0.49766 NA 
2011 Egypt MEA LD -3.841 -0.83402 -0.87348 -0.76989 
2012 Egypt MEA LD -1.180 -0.95071 -0.95037 -0.76278 
2013 Egypt MEA LD -1.345 -1.1689 -1.16016 -0.82631 
2014 Egypt MEA LD 1.126 -1.05427 -1.51523 -0.91003 
2006 Finland EU D 1.813 1.61499 2.04694 1.5526 
2007 Finland EU D 2.328 1.64914 2.11281 1.59917 
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2008 Finland EU D -1.750 1.65954 2.174 1.56131 
2009 Finland EU D -7.216 1.61845 1.8019 1.52964 
2010 Finland EU D 2.319 1.55121 1.64433 NA 
2011 Finland EU D 1.121 1.56583 1.68342 1.55763 
2012 Finland EU D -2.293 1.58729 1.63745 1.56616 
2013 Finland EU D -0.504 1.58803 1.49378 1.55496 
2014 Finland EU D -0.783 1.59894 1.39641 1.54092 
2006 France EU D 1.448 0.78115 0.35953 1.15551 
2007 France EU D -0.423 0.80092 0.22578 1.17969 
2008 France EU D -1.645 0.79048 0.23459 1.20919 
2009 France EU D -2.328 0.67931 0.02704 1.19328 
2010 France EU D 0.860 0.764 0.11529 NA 
2011 France EU D 0.626 0.76619 0.09453 1.22907 
2012 France EU D -0.631 0.73433 -0.08911 1.1665 
2013 France EU D 0.550 0.6948 0.02775 1.18001 
2014 France EU D -0.702 0.6476 0.24219 1.15797 
2006 Germany EU D 1.494 1.30186 1.21622 1.59412 
2007 Germany EU D 0.959 1.29969 1.29506 1.60816 
2008 Germany EU D -0.623 1.28666 0.94784 1.4777 
2009 Germany EU D -4.347 1.21402 0.42404 1.36998 
2010 Germany EU D 2.421 1.18996 0.26086 NA 
2011 Germany EU D 1.850 1.18898 0.19595 1.33301 
2012 Germany EU D -0.206 1.1876 0.33507 1.3435 
2013 Germany EU D -0.055 1.18224 0.35808 1.3518 
2014 Germany EU D 0.203 1.22274 0.34855 1.30843 
2006 Greece EU D 2.696 0.21593 -0.23165 0.30227 
2007 Greece EU D 0.128 0.18472 -0.35335 0.27934 
2008 Greece EU D -2.879 0.01518 -0.39639 0.27828 
2009 Greece EU D -4.551 -0.27315 -0.68368 0.30021 
2010 Greece EU D -2.994 -0.31947 -1.03006 NA 
2011 Greece EU D -5.928 -0.37169 -1.32559 0.12242 
2012 Greece EU D -3.617 -0.51006 -1.70466 0.07479 
2013 Greece EU D -0.606 -0.38153 -1.88971 0.04894 
2014 Greece EU D 2.179 -0.37503 -1.83123 0.09551 
2006 Guatemala LA LD 0.198 -1.21975 -0.98228 -1.12933 
2007 Guatemala LA LD 3.500 -1.13396 -0.57459 -1.03193 
2008 Guatemala LA LD 1.350 -1.10499 -0.52894 -1.12738 
2009 Guatemala LA LD -0.440 -1.157 -0.74071 -1.15969 
2010 Guatemala LA LD 2.903 -1.17413 -0.68589 NA 
2011 Guatemala LA LD 1.578 -1.17349 -0.60811 -1.00643 
2012 Guatemala LA LD -3.719 -1.15035 -0.53036 -0.96945 
2013 Guatemala LA LD 3.783 -1.12068 -0.50072 -0.91323 
2014 Guatemala LA LD 1.305 -1.11566 -0.49822 -0.86293 
2006 HongKong APAC D 3.530 1.1466 1.51228 0.43248 
2007 HongKong APAC D 2.045 1.19342 1.52618 0.48563 
2008 HongKong APAC D 0.333 1.20715 1.5151 0.46714 
2009 HongKong APAC D -3.302 1.17198 1.31211 0.51272 
2010 HongKong APAC D 3.195 1.21472 1.21571 NA 
2011 HongKong APAC D 2.106 1.1865 1.13717 0.62124 
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2012 HongKong APAC D -1.189 1.16582 1.23335 0.64595 
2013 HongKong APAC D -0.432 1.16244 1.35866 0.67657 
2014 HongKong APAC D 0.309 1.30999 1.24759 0.69364 
2006 Hungary Eastern EU D 1.726 0.3935 0.69417 0.56551 
2007 Hungary Eastern EU D -1.663 0.33192 0.6744 0.58862 
2008 Hungary Eastern EU D -0.136 0.26656 0.41119 0.48517 
2009 Hungary Eastern EU D -6.199 0.12635 -0.05634 0.44937 
2010 Hungary Eastern EU D 0.196 0.12658 -0.29957 NA 
2011 Hungary Eastern EU D 0.493 0.13806 -0.34172 0.48126 
2012 Hungary Eastern EU D -0.139 0.03259 -0.64127 0.46526 
2013 Hungary Eastern EU D 0.841 0.08687 -0.78746 0.4309 
2014 Hungary Eastern EU D 0.646 0.03271 -0.80128 0.38202 
2006 Iceland EU D -1.561 1.49392 2.21454 0.6236 
2007 Iceland EU D 3.608 1.51616 2.11713 0.59765 
2008 Iceland EU D -1.701 1.47331 1.70992 0.62484 
2009 Iceland EU D 1.428 1.30081 0.65327 0.49044 
2010 Iceland EU D -2.169 1.23609 0.15441 NA 
2011 Iceland EU D 1.048 1.27725 0.20633 0.46416 
2012 Iceland EU D 1.393 1.24353 0.24368 0.46309 
2013 Iceland EU D 2.604 1.22207 0.31161 0.34903 
2014 Iceland EU D -0.151 1.19799 0.36623 0.33215 
2006 India APAC LD 1.701 -0.32324 1.18379 -0.21424 
2007 India APAC LD 1.266 -0.46105 0.99689 -0.2816 
2008 India APAC LD 0.500 -0.50931 0.76264 -0.36799 
2009 India APAC LD -0.333 -0.60868 0.51033 -0.29373 
2010 India APAC LD 3.003 -0.64484 0.25806 NA 
2011 India APAC LD 0.899 -0.7731 0.19263 -0.33394 
2012 India APAC LD 0.722 -0.72161 0.21314 -0.28933 
2013 India APAC LD 1.326 -0.65741 0.19916 -0.25353 
2014 India APAC LD 1.969 -0.68058 -0.30066 -0.24162 
2006 Indonesia APAC LD 1.969 -1.27907 0.38383 -1.18424 
2007 Indonesia APAC LD -0.453 -1.15557 0.06935 -1.26636 
2008 Indonesia APAC LD 1.534 -1.00244 -0.18504 -1.33017 
2009 Indonesia APAC LD 0.438 -0.91359 0.35117 -1.14381 
2010 Indonesia APAC LD 1.842 -0.93937 0.32867 NA 
2011 Indonesia APAC LD 1.851 -0.92781 0.25751 -1.16595 
2012 Indonesia APAC LD 1.458 -0.87134 0.29831 -1.13627 
2013 Indonesia APAC LD 1.254 -0.81402 0.28467 -1.06718 
2014 Indonesia APAC LD 0.896 -0.68872 0.24348 -1.00283 
2006 Ireland EU D -0.268 1.25066 1.64091 1.18709 
2007 Ireland EU D 0.004 1.2516 1.6217 1.19989 
2008 Ireland EU D -3.607 1.28607 1.40417 1.23561 
2009 Ireland EU D -1.637 1.29093 0.48752 1.20638 
2010 Ireland EU D 2.258 1.25045 -0.02307 NA 
2011 Ireland EU D 2.570 1.20077 -0.09505 1.24384 
2012 Ireland EU D -0.955 1.18311 -0.20716 1.17932 
2013 Ireland EU D -0.646 1.19615 -0.18142 1.1635 
2014 Ireland EU D 2.745 1.26299 0.02372 1.20829 
2006 Israel MEA D 2.646 0.20616 0.85426 0.84552 
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2007 Israel MEA D 1.140 0.13753 0.87774 0.77513 
2008 Israel MEA D -0.846 0.07311 0.47936 0.59116 
2009 Israel MEA D -1.119 0.02834 -0.31092 0.45243 
2010 Israel MEA D 2.094 0.14234 -0.29507 NA 
2011 Israel MEA D 1.315 0.20952 0.21071 0.63631 
2012 Israel MEA D -0.366 0.19365 0.16628 0.6827 
2013 Israel MEA D 0.144 0.18418 -0.17588 0.64857 
2014 Israel MEA D -0.055 0.2282 -0.18697 0.62529 
2006 Italy EU D -0.198 -0.06254 0.03612 0.56007 
2007 Italy EU D -0.471 -0.0498 0.01907 0.58193 
2008 Italy EU D -1.669 -0.08062 -0.2429 0.58833 
2009 Italy EU D -3.983 -0.26455 -0.54468 0.47859 
2010 Italy EU D 1.633 -0.19117 -0.62026 NA 
2011 Italy EU D 0.186 -0.0546 -0.62123 0.40827 
2012 Italy EU D -1.423 -0.13314 -0.72942 0.40365 
2013 Italy EU D -0.126 -0.15106 -0.93971 0.41005 
2014 Italy EU D -0.270 -0.21991 -0.88636 0.39956 
2006 Japan APAC D 0.096 0.92626 1.00669 1.42132 
2007 Japan APAC D 0.926 0.86865 1.03701 1.42505 
2008 Japan APAC D -1.129 0.83571 0.93095 1.43269 
2009 Japan APAC D -3.161 0.89336 0.68087 1.40217 
2010 Japan APAC D 3.933 0.96706 0.51071 NA 
2011 Japan APAC D -0.510 1.01658 0.56166 1.33506 
2012 Japan APAC D 0.735 1.02457 0.57582 1.37043 
2013 Japan APAC D 0.942 1.10009 0.73953 1.49142 
2014 Japan APAC D -0.687 1.19045 0.69705 1.55648 
2006 Jordan MEA LD 2.017 -0.19621 -0.047 -0.33557 
2007 Jordan MEA LD 0.046 -0.04063 0.26542 -0.32099 
2008 Jordan MEA LD 2.142 -0.01231 0.4604 -0.23976 
2009 Jordan MEA LD 0.709 -0.11032 0.28671 -0.14389 
2010 Jordan MEA LD 0.212 -0.2181 -0.04973 NA 
2011 Jordan MEA LD 0.489 -0.29869 -0.1728 -0.24751 
2012 Jordan MEA LD 0.439 -0.26463 -0.00109 -0.18672 
2013 Jordan MEA LD -2.141 -0.27255 0.10538 -0.15401 
2014 Jordan MEA LD -4.201 -0.21406 0.14392 -0.15135 
2006 Kenya MEA LD 1.079 -1.26792 -0.74845 -1.04968 
2007 Kenya MEA LD 2.064 -1.33412 -0.50381 -1.03369 
2008 Kenya MEA LD -4.191 -1.39706 -0.26098 -1.01324 
2009 Kenya MEA LD -0.224 -1.48295 -0.55596 -0.95055 
2010 Kenya MEA LD 3.911 -1.39058 -0.70948 NA 
2011 Kenya MEA LD 2.002 -1.3354 -0.5681 -1.02526 
2012 Kenya MEA LD -0.152 -1.28342 -0.75048 -0.96607 
2013 Kenya MEA LD 1.410 -1.09389 -0.83162 -0.88781 
2014 Kenya MEA LD 0.570 -0.99171 -0.62281 -0.81511 
2006 Lithuania Eastern EU D 3.044 -0.06154 0.9245 -0.22904 
2007 Lithuania Eastern EU D 3.545 0.00059 0.79949 -0.10071 
2008 Lithuania Eastern EU D -1.316 0.02937 0.7125 0.01109 
2009 Lithuania Eastern EU D -11.074 0.0059 0.08162 -0.00783 
2010 Lithuania Eastern EU D 2.505 0.0493 -0.3093 NA 
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2011 Lithuania Eastern EU D 4.260 -0.00262 -0.30722 -0.13489 
2012 Lithuania Eastern EU D 1.246 0.07882 -0.26648 -0.08263 
2013 Lithuania Eastern EU D 1.265 0.18045 -0.27208 -0.05846 
2014 Lithuania Eastern EU D 0.249 0.1669 -0.17535 -0.03144 
2006 Luxembourg EU D 1.151 1.28207 NA 1.17449 
2007 Luxembourg EU D 2.774 1.32961 1.26744 1.20755 
2008 Luxembourg EU D -6.009 1.40904 1.31944 1.22071 
2009 Luxembourg EU D -5.688 1.40628 1.3265 1.30351 
2010 Luxembourg EU D 2.940 1.4107 1.17342 NA 
2011 Luxembourg EU D -1.226 1.43687 1.03922 1.30514 
2012 Luxembourg EU D -4.034 1.38538 0.86034 1.28221 
2013 Luxembourg EU D 2.289 1.35258 0.80454 1.29115 
2014 Luxembourg EU D 0.678 1.43782 0.93494 1.33132 
2006 Malaysia APAC LD 1.700 0.2136 0.59786 0.09916 
2007 Malaysia APAC LD 2.039 0.14896 0.64197 0.09348 
2008 Malaysia APAC LD 1.564 -0.08387 0.58838 -0.01051 
2009 Malaysia APAC LD -4.729 -0.17883 0.33202 -0.04959 
2010 Malaysia APAC LD 0.895 -0.05156 0.22098 NA 
2011 Malaysia APAC LD 1.099 -0.02113 0.51357 0.19179 
2012 Malaysia APAC LD 0.538 -0.00347 0.51088 0.1646 
2013 Malaysia APAC LD -0.684 0.01698 0.47113 0.15198 
2014 Malaysia APAC LD 1.025 0.19582 0.69058 0.26627 
2006 Malta EU D -1.049 0.89308 NA 0.00859 
2007 Malta EU D 0.826 0.94213 NA 0.08716 
2008 Malta EU D 0.482 0.9472 NA 0.08378 
2009 Malta EU D -3.083 0.80117 NA 0.13503 
2010 Malta EU D 1.628 0.78936 NA NA 
2011 Malta EU D 1.340 0.7197 NA 0.2971 
2012 Malta EU D 1.497 0.7453 0.48064 0.32448 
2013 Malta EU D 1.879 0.69585 0.47287 0.34413 
2014 Malta EU D 1.385 0.62167 0.23661 0.23962 
2006 Mexico LA LD 1.365 -0.75522 -0.53999 -0.4411 
2007 Mexico LA LD -0.282 -0.8008 -0.56012 -0.44555 
2008 Mexico LA LD -3.111 -0.89083 -0.66104 -0.52429 
2009 Mexico LA LD -5.386 -0.88239 -0.74625 -0.50459 
2010 Mexico LA LD -0.177 -0.90752 -0.92893 NA 
2011 Mexico LA LD 0.966 -0.88938 -0.84182 -0.32952 
2012 Mexico LA LD 0.348 -0.8681 -0.67313 -0.2474 
2013 Mexico LA LD -1.439 -0.90295 -0.73765 -0.17902 
2014 Mexico LA LD -0.036 -0.99642 -1.03207 -0.21528 
2006 Morocco MEA LD -0.727 -0.745 -0.52111 -0.57691 
2007 Morocco MEA LD 1.276 -0.63777 -0.15028 -0.48182 
2008 Morocco MEA LD -2.462 -0.66738 -0.46269 -0.63486 
2009 Morocco MEA LD -4.402 -0.646 -0.62457 -0.66285 
2010 Morocco MEA LD 0.344 -0.60236 -0.67203 NA 
2011 Morocco MEA LD -0.417 -0.66288 -0.63845 -0.49217 
2012 Morocco MEA LD 0.142 -0.69773 -0.66934 -0.51812 
2013 Morocco MEA LD 1.634 -0.71635 -0.66619 -0.57015 
2014 Morocco MEA LD -0.041 -0.60231 -0.50055 -0.43986 
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2006 Netherlands EU D 1.050 1.31926 1.71206 1.4813 
2007 Netherlands EU D 0.551 1.35621 1.80551 1.45784 
2008 Netherlands EU D -0.695 1.37844 1.7114 1.4198 
2009 Netherlands EU D -3.801 1.38103 1.15191 1.40641 
2010 Netherlands EU D 1.201 1.36008 0.77247 NA 
2011 Netherlands EU D 0.207 1.42639 0.85106 1.3807 
2012 Netherlands EU D -1.159 1.47039 0.87419 1.42176 
2013 Netherlands EU D -0.420 1.37879 0.5525 1.39149 
2014 Netherlands EU D 0.377 1.36612 0.45649 1.37833 
2006 NewZealand APAC D -0.970 1.46987 1.85606 1.01168 
2007 NewZealand APAC D 0.934 1.53471 1.97021 1.01595 
2008 NewZealand APAC D -3.050 1.54126 1.86111 1.01737 
2009 NewZealand APAC D -0.436 1.59215 1.51683 1.08473 
2010 NewZealand APAC D 0.202 1.61111 1.07531 NA 
2011 NewZealand APAC D -0.168 1.64204 1.22487 1.01706 
2012 NewZealand APAC D 1.257 1.62658 1.54352 1.09403 
2013 NewZealand APAC D -1.303 1.6516 1.49277 1.10073 
2014 NewZealand APAC D -0.979 1.67962 1.39832 1.07869 
2006 Nigeria MEA LD 3.330 -1.5156 -1.51041 -1.21926 
2007 Nigeria MEA LD 5.108 -1.47065 -1.35879 -1.22441 
2008 Nigeria MEA LD 4.215 -1.24789 -1.30932 -1.22512 
2009 Nigeria MEA LD 3.989 -1.37721 -1.5242 -1.17014 
2010 Nigeria MEA LD 3.932 -1.55868 -1.79545 NA 
2011 Nigeria MEA LD 0.754 -1.49607 -1.81591 -1.29013 
2012 Nigeria MEA LD 2.097 -1.5247 -1.70892 -1.25831 
2013 Nigeria MEA LD -0.084 -1.6272 -1.81841 -1.28657 
2014 Nigeria MEA LD 0.777 -1.66588 -2.23925 -1.31714 
2006 Norway EU D -1.857 1.45709 2.19695 1.13657 
2007 Norway EU D -2.183 1.36623 2.39783 1.14937 
2008 Norway EU D -4.034 1.38635 2.33589 1.20003 
2009 Norway EU D -2.688 1.41312 1.93176 1.15942 
2010 Norway EU D -1.005 1.47341 1.74684 NA 
2011 Norway EU D -1.563 1.50127 1.80514 1.20879 
2012 Norway EU D 0.082 1.52757 1.72237 1.19066 
2013 Norway EU D -1.040 1.55241 1.61899 1.20838 
2014 Norway EU D -0.073 1.5097 1.67877 1.22278 
2006 Pakistan APAC LD -0.554 NA -0.07049 -1.65204 
2007 Pakistan APAC LD 0.369 NA 0.1343 -1.46149 
2008 Pakistan APAC LD -1.318 NA -0.04383 -1.58147 
2009 Pakistan APAC LD -0.587 NA -0.3778 -1.62593 
2010 Pakistan APAC LD -0.463 NA -0.49073 NA 
2011 Pakistan APAC LD 0.733 NA -0.56585 -1.58172 
2012 Pakistan APAC LD 2.284 NA -0.71825 -1.61105 
2013 Pakistan APAC LD 2.865 NA -0.82485 -1.63078 
2014 Pakistan APAC LD 3.122 NA -1.29683 -1.64464 
2006 Peru LA LD 3.090 -1.16941 -0.37609 -1.04139 
2007 Peru LA LD 3.135 -1.12838 -0.28863 -1.05259 
2008 Peru LA LD 2.142 -1.04146 -0.11134 -1.10591 
2009 Peru LA LD -2.875 -1.1054 -0.15735 -1.05747 
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2010 Peru LA LD 1.986 -1.05905 -0.09686 NA 
2011 Peru LA LD -0.274 -0.99732 0.08728 -0.85021 
2012 Peru LA LD -0.133 -1.09349 0.0416 -0.83883 
2013 Peru LA LD -0.240 -1.06384 -0.06446 -0.75641 
2014 Peru LA LD -2.471 -1.04355 -0.26331 -0.7541 
2006 Philippines APAC LD 2.737 -1.2455 -0.81179 -0.54136 
2007 Philippines APAC LD 3.689 -1.18447 -0.7762 -0.49408 
2008 Philippines APAC LD 0.009 -1.22521 -0.88607 -0.482 
2009 Philippines APAC LD -1.705 -1.28789 -1.11344 -0.51885 
2010 Philippines APAC LD 3.107 -1.32379 -1.05036 NA 
2011 Philippines APAC LD -1.111 -1.19991 -1.01572 -0.61023 
2012 Philippines APAC LD 4.221 -1.09973 -0.75893 -0.47994 
2013 Philippines APAC LD 2.602 -0.96575 -0.58083 -0.37738 
2014 Philippines APAC LD 2.418 -0.79215 -0.49745 -0.34254 
2006 Poland Eastern EU LD 2.020 -0.19615 -0.3231 -0.13377 
2007 Poland Eastern EU LD 1.641 -0.08933 -0.37838 -0.17216 
2008 Poland Eastern EU LD -1.135 0.07911 -0.42226 -0.20291 
2009 Poland Eastern EU LD 0.249 0.19932 -0.46595 -0.07324 
2010 Poland Eastern EU LD 2.881 0.28286 -0.42701 NA 
2011 Poland Eastern EU LD 2.306 0.34359 -0.48657 -0.00277 
2012 Poland Eastern EU LD -0.462 0.34841 -0.64512 -0.01539 
2013 Poland Eastern EU LD -0.535 0.30255 -0.62167 0.00802 
2014 Poland Eastern EU LD 0.026 0.29192 -0.54681 0.03575 
2006 Portugal EU D 0.124 0.72271 1.04607 0.75628 
2007 Portugal EU D 0.262 0.69753 0.99982 0.71256 
2008 Portugal EU D -1.336 0.67645 0.71996 0.7074 
2009 Portugal EU D -2.669 0.54988 0.23624 0.68273 
2010 Portugal EU D 1.421 0.45359 0.07733 NA 
2011 Portugal EU D -0.746 0.40252 0.39914 0.52262 
2012 Portugal EU D -1.624 0.36877 0.19637 0.56706 
2013 Portugal EU D -0.187 0.4145 0.11159 0.60497 
2014 Portugal EU D -0.394 0.50559 0.25845 0.62648 
2006 Qatar MEA LD 6.561 0.66508 NA -0.42584 
2007 Qatar MEA LD -5.338 0.58208 NA -0.35847 
2008 Qatar MEA LD -1.836 0.7691 0.93941 -0.28933 
2009 Qatar MEA LD -2.995 1.12761 1.11815 -0.25945 
2010 Qatar MEA LD 5.262 1.05081 1.00296 NA 
2011 Qatar MEA LD 1.848 0.86068 0.86856 -0.38268 
2012 Qatar MEA LD -3.350 0.98666 0.98681 -0.41805 
2013 Qatar MEA LD -3.390 0.9747 1.14887 -0.40632 
2014 Qatar MEA LD -2.251 0.84183 1.25677 -0.27141 
2006 Russia Eastern EU LD 6.639 -1.33554 -0.78459 -0.86165 
2007 Russia Eastern EU LD 6.125 -1.27947 -0.67106 -0.80992 
2008 Russia Eastern EU LD 4.161 -1.23372 -0.54655 -0.70967 
2009 Russia Eastern EU LD -6.007 -1.29016 -0.82982 -0.63356 
2010 Russia Eastern EU LD 3.941 -1.26686 -1.02142 NA 
2011 Russia Eastern EU LD 3.244 -1.29653 -0.98965 -0.68366 
2012 Russia Eastern EU LD 2.381 -1.27738 -0.82381 -0.64776 
2013 Russia Eastern EU LD 1.357 -1.21539 -0.60318 -0.56208 
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2014 Russia Eastern EU LD 0.558 -1.17954 -0.48219 -0.52102 
2006 SaudiArabia MEA LD -4.206 -1.05288 -3.44047 NA 
2007 SaudiArabia MEA LD -6.365 -0.37635 0.46715 -0.56571 
2008 SaudiArabia MEA LD -2.255 -0.19379 0.72256 -0.37214 
2009 SaudiArabia MEA LD -8.265 -0.22932 0.80373 -0.31965 
2010 SaudiArabia MEA LD -2.056 -0.07337 0.95056 NA 
2011 SaudiArabia MEA LD 2.210 -0.20685 1.10832 -0.21354 
2012 SaudiArabia MEA LD -1.782 -0.1461 0.84976 -0.21461 
2013 SaudiArabia MEA LD -3.780 -0.11841 0.52656 -0.24607 
2014 SaudiArabia MEA LD -1.825 -0.07338 0.42436 -0.27966 
2006 Senegal MEA LD -2.682 -1.12072 NA NA 
2007 Senegal MEA LD -0.772 -0.86392 -1.1968 -1.1729 
2008 Senegal MEA LD -1.559 -0.82217 -1.01848 -1.0746 
2009 Senegal MEA LD -2.179 -0.83502 -1.02144 -1.08018 
2010 Senegal MEA LD -0.578 -0.88102 -0.85569 NA 
2011 Senegal MEA LD -3.052 -0.8889 -0.82679 -1.1342 
2012 Senegal MEA LD -0.164 -0.7579 -0.92358 -1.17615 
2013 Senegal MEA LD -1.645 -0.64304 -0.86193 -1.1486 
2014 Senegal MEA LD -1.118 -0.48278 -0.60743 -1.09225 
2006 Singapore APAC D 1.124 1.22235 1.61494 1.08808 
2007 Singapore APAC D 2.329 1.2819 1.68695 1.12949 
2008 Singapore APAC D -5.093 1.38197 1.45751 1.16078 
2009 Singapore APAC D -4.395 1.30583 1.32683 1.18204 
2010 Singapore APAC D 7.452 1.28601 1.23492 NA 
2011 Singapore APAC D 1.298 1.28594 1.31255 1.1592 
2012 Singapore APAC D -2.080 1.36601 1.33908 1.15635 
2013 Singapore APAC D 0.007 1.33774 1.2473 1.16648 
2014 Singapore APAC D -0.101 1.33057 1.21432 1.17555 
2006 Slovakia Eastern EU D 5.819 0.02171 0.85974 0.3176 
2007 Slovakia Eastern EU D 7.133 0.0728 1.06066 0.29663 
2008 Slovakia Eastern EU D 2.382 0.12654 1.0378 0.24739 
2009 Slovakia Eastern EU D -4.714 0.01292 0.64779 0.31108 
2010 Slovakia Eastern EU D 3.919 -0.05266 0.13423 NA 
2011 Slovakia Eastern EU D 1.017 -0.09969 -0.05849 0.42095 
2012 Slovakia Eastern EU D 0.921 -0.13957 -0.03495 0.41668 
2013 Slovakia Eastern EU D 1.574 -0.19895 -0.03134 0.434 
2014 Slovakia Eastern EU D 1.404 -0.21824 0.02247 0.44502 
2006 SouthAfrica MEA LD 1.382 0.0924 0.55716 0.63853 
2007 SouthAfrica MEA LD 2.260 0.07333 0.58286 0.68048 
2008 SouthAfrica MEA LD -1.198 -0.02612 0.80195 0.71958 
2009 SouthAfrica MEA LD -2.269 -0.11007 0.52337 0.67577 
2010 SouthAfrica MEA LD 1.984 -0.14266 0.08285 NA 
2011 SouthAfrica MEA LD -1.229 -0.09093 0.05482 0.63572 
2012 SouthAfrica MEA LD -0.591 -0.10177 0.21911 0.73526 
2013 SouthAfrica MEA LD -1.331 -0.04684 0.37573 0.77952 
2014 SouthAfrica MEA LD -1.229 -0.07053 0.29032 0.73277 
2006 SouthKorea APAC D 2.314 0.10064 0.02598 0.5956 
2007 SouthKorea APAC D 3.514 0.43164 0.77955 0.84569 
2008 SouthKorea APAC D 2.247 0.24773 0.67494 0.72962 
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2009 SouthKorea APAC D -0.286 0.17555 -0.31262 0.54322 
2010 SouthKorea APAC D 4.806 0.11631 -0.748 NA 
2011 SouthKorea APAC D 3.349 0.12406 -0.85041 0.49631 
2012 SouthKorea APAC D -2.651 0.06079 -0.70507 0.5731 
2013 SouthKorea APAC D 2.728 0.05003 -0.7611 0.49982 
2014 SouthKorea APAC D -1.003 -0.00533 -0.91439 0.40508 
2006 Spain EU D -0.588 0.15118 0.84484 0.61871 
2007 Spain EU D -0.392 0.09985 0.93456 0.71291 
2008 Spain EU D -1.509 0.20743 0.71824 0.64892 
2009 Spain EU D -1.254 0.11628 0.2172 0.56085 
2010 Spain EU D 0.236 0.12847 -0.06659 NA 
2011 Spain EU D -0.574 0.2494 -0.13547 0.43929 
2012 Spain EU D -0.536 0.2205 -0.45788 0.40143 
2013 Spain EU D -0.591 0.10047 -0.64331 0.36367 
2014 Spain EU D -0.109 -0.01811 -0.82562 0.246 
2006 SriLanka APAC LD 3.472 -0.84603 -0.46819 -1.16334 
2007 SriLanka APAC LD 3.553 -0.80416 -0.01782 -1.02097 
2008 SriLanka APAC LD 5.610 -0.7969 -0.10445 -1.0359 
2009 SriLanka APAC LD 1.809 -0.64873 -0.48232 -1.01787 
2010 SriLanka APAC LD 3.634 -0.50567 -0.45363 NA 
2011 SriLanka APAC LD 4.000 -0.54042 -0.63028 -0.78137 
2012 SriLanka APAC LD 2.374 -0.60147 -0.86683 -0.85798 
2013 SriLanka APAC LD 3.140 -0.63876 -0.80354 -0.86989 
2014 SriLanka APAC LD 4.977 -0.60426 -0.83196 -0.82474 
2006 Sweden EU D 2.059 1.31477 1.93377 1.40852 
2007 Sweden EU D -0.244 1.4719 2.13587 1.44567 
2008 Sweden EU D -3.022 1.51935 2.05111 1.42825 
2009 Sweden EU D -4.612 1.54004 1.73272 1.47621 
2010 Sweden EU D 3.500 1.54308 1.59577 NA 
2011 Sweden EU D 0.254 1.53612 1.88498 1.45136 
2012 Sweden EU D -1.398 1.49471 1.76152 1.31805 
2013 Sweden EU D -0.014 1.47566 1.56202 1.30152 
2014 Sweden EU D 0.249 1.34103 1.42555 1.28179 
2006 Switzerland EU D 1.727 1.42052 1.50497 1.35976 
2007 Switzerland EU D 1.465 1.47216 1.55924 1.37824 
2008 Switzerland EU D -0.079 1.49305 1.45563 1.37096 
2009 Switzerland EU D -2.827 1.44909 1.1792 1.31334 
2010 Switzerland EU D 2.021 1.442 1.11326 NA 
2011 Switzerland EU D -0.368 1.44102 1.1415 1.29369 
2012 Switzerland EU D -0.203 1.50024 1.12831 1.28249 
2013 Switzerland EU D 0.727 1.44547 1.03928 1.26329 
2014 Switzerland EU D 0.236 1.51299 1.00159 1.28107 
2006 Taiwan APAC D 2.174 0.20852 1.23575 0.47259 
2007 Taiwan APAC D 3.632 0.1987 1.07423 0.47117 
2008 Taiwan APAC D -0.128 0.321 1.10408 0.48379 
2009 Taiwan APAC D -1.034 0.33079 1.01373 0.54271 
2010 Taiwan APAC D 7.622 0.46163 0.96781 NA 
2011 Taiwan APAC D 1.338 0.54491 1.02085 0.55283 
2012 Taiwan APAC D 0.142 0.49639 1.16014 0.62055 
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2013 Taiwan APAC D 0.343 0.4631 1.15994 0.57444 
2014 Taiwan APAC D 1.614 0.45111 0.94562 0.55578 
2006 Thailand APAC LD 1.694 -0.64329 0.60635 -0.97301 
2007 Thailand APAC LD 2.119 -0.60072 0.65831 -0.99079 
2008 Thailand APAC LD -0.841 -0.71769 0.54538 -1.1001 
2009 Thailand APAC LD -3.779 -0.78881 0.2221 -1.16632 
2010 Thailand APAC LD 4.781 -0.77115 0.00127 NA 
2011 Thailand APAC LD -2.378 -0.70908 -0.11586 -0.86892 
2012 Thailand APAC LD 4.403 -0.76741 -0.02202 -0.8778 
2013 Thailand APAC LD 1.838 -0.82136 0.15588 -0.85559 
2014 Thailand APAC LD 0.071 -0.74057 0.15598 -0.8778 
2006 Turkey MEA LD 0.645 -0.48537 -0.4644 -0.33688 
2007 Turkey MEA LD -0.057 -0.43626 -0.19045 -0.25672 
2008 Turkey MEA LD -3.404 -0.50085 -0.37202 -0.37634 
2009 Turkey MEA LD -6.451 -0.60367 -0.71609 -0.42978 
2010 Turkey MEA LD 3.347 -0.63676 -0.78385 NA 
2011 Turkey MEA LD 1.898 -0.67621 -0.65212 -0.49926 
2012 Turkey MEA LD -2.287 -0.68448 -0.3829 -0.33289 
2013 Turkey MEA LD 0.174 -0.69894 -0.28218 -0.21883 
2014 Turkey MEA LD -0.646 -0.79759 -0.42457 -0.20354 
2006 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 6.783 -1.0035 -1.33663 -0.96244 
2007 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 6.718 -0.93571 -1.26248 -0.95142 
2008 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 1.523 -0.95787 -1.15884 -0.94751 
2009 Ukraine Eastern EU LD -13.525 -1.18221 -1.69219 -0.96713 
2010 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 7.687 -1.15569 -2.16621 NA 
2011 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 5.590 -1.16474 -2.09949 -0.91439 
2012 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 0.318 -1.0873 -1.92887 -0.88933 
2013 Ukraine Eastern EU LD 0.414 -1.34191 -2.01113 -0.94798 
2014 Ukraine Eastern EU LD -5.856 -1.67483 -1.46619 -0.90142 
2006 UK EU D 0.981 1.15491 1.67515 1.46936 
2007 UK EU D 0.649 1.08439 1.51741 1.41248 
2008 UK EU D -1.877 0.9889 1.03919 1.2358 
2009 UK EU D -2.959 0.94016 0.28696 1.21391 
2010 UK EU D 0.561 1.06669 0.07824 NA 
2011 UK EU D 1.044 1.01289 0.36434 1.31389 
2012 UK EU D -0.672 1.05928 0.49003 1.37325 
2013 UK EU D 0.331 1.09388 0.25006 1.38013 
2014 UK EU D 0.308 1.13538 0.27618 1.40662 
2006 USA NA D -0.345 0.77287 1.88725 1.66931 
2007 USA NA D -0.334 0.72826 1.68182 1.51218 
2008 USA NA D -0.929 0.88177 1.64818 1.56053 
2009 USA NA D -0.068 0.77558 0.9739 1.51805 
2010 USA NA D 1.768 0.72143 0.66731 NA 
2011 USA NA D -0.196 0.75448 0.77976 1.39753 
2012 USA NA D 0.150 0.78965 0.80106 1.38011 
2013 USA NA D -0.255 0.77518 0.92991 1.44321 
2014 USA NA D 0.237 0.79583 0.76475 1.51165 
2006 Venezuela LA LD 4.133 -1.77429 -1.3095 -1.40003 
2007 Venezuela LA LD 2.401 -1.83061 -1.29704 -1.45033 
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2008 Venezuela LA LD -0.215 -1.84968 -1.46888 -1.48019 
2009 Venezuela LA LD -5.463 -1.84433 -1.83561 -1.43918 
2010 Venezuela LA LD -4.212 -1.81383 -2.08861 NA 
2011 Venezuela LA LD 0.889 -1.7747 -2.16029 -1.74044 
2012 Venezuela LA LD 2.549 -1.85091 -2.02536 -1.76853 
2013 Venezuela LA LD -1.221 -1.93899 -2.18469 -1.80331 
2014 Venezuela LA LD -6.524 -1.93113 -2.23595 -1.80651 
2006 Vietnam APAC LD -0.316 -0.63253 -0.35025 -1.42871 
2007 Vietnam APAC LD -1.603 -0.60732 -0.36557 -1.36685 
2008 Vietnam APAC LD -2.886 -0.63043 -0.27062 -1.30304 
2009 Vietnam APAC LD -0.647 -0.55325 -0.22198 -1.27833 
2010 Vietnam APAC LD -0.342 -0.6108 -0.47503 NA 
2011 Vietnam APAC LD 1.996 -0.63105 -0.75047 -1.11752 
2012 Vietnam APAC LD 0.401 -0.64419 -0.87277 -1.0665 
2013 Vietnam APAC LD 1.112 -0.63926 -0.89424 -1.01544 
2014 Vietnam APAC LD 1.619 -0.64971 -0.71643 -0.95998 
2006 Zambia MEA LD 4.456 -0.79582 -0.99997 -1.84427 
2007 Zambia MEA LD 4.458 -0.68727 -0.78577 -1.7522 
2008 Zambia MEA LD 3.639 -0.52337 -0.28756 -1.53784 
2009 Zambia MEA LD 5.797 -0.48065 -0.42157 -1.46191 
2010 Zambia MEA LD 6.714 -0.50809 -0.78007 NA 
2011 Zambia MEA LD -0.260 -0.53257 -0.6277 -1.35334 
2012 Zambia MEA LD 0.657 -0.43931 -0.33869 -1.29646 
2013 Zambia MEA LD -0.031 -0.43287 -0.21093 -1.27194 
2014 Zambia MEA LD 1.219 -0.50406 -0.36367 -1.22821 
2006 Zimbabwe MEA LD -1.695 -1.74606 -1.09259 -1.4796 
2007 Zimbabwe MEA LD -1.801 -1.82958 -1.04504 -1.53986 
2008 Zimbabwe MEA LD -16.220 -1.79438 -0.95274 -1.54644 
2009 Zimbabwe MEA LD 9.217 -1.80784 -1.39646 -1.5278 
2010 Zimbabwe MEA LD 11.576 -1.74649 -1.58375 NA 
2011 Zimbabwe MEA LD 12.007 -1.63965 -1.38391 -1.51576 
2012 Zimbabwe MEA LD 12.436 -1.53217 -1.32431 -1.50971 
2013 Zimbabwe MEA LD 3.372 -1.51066 -1.36114 -1.55344 
2014 Zimbabwe MEA LD 0.874 -1.50348 -1.6396 -1.59361 
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